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                                                             ABSTRACT 
In this project, I explore and problematize the demarcation of religious versus secular based 
women’s activism in Egypt. In doing so, this thesis accompanies the body of literature that 
contests liberal feminists’ assumptions that Islam and gender justice are incompatible and that 
Muslim women’s lives are linked to religious and cultural factors only. Through fieldwork at 
the Cariene women’s NGO, Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA), this 
thesis reveals that women’s rights work can operate within frameworks, which are rooted 
simultaneously in liberal secular ideas, and Islamic discourses of gender justice. CEWLA is 
an organization that aims to establish equity among citizens and runs myriads of right based- 
and development driven projects. The center bases its mission and objectives on the 
international human rights conventions of which CEDAW is a significant reference. However, 
the organization systematically engages Islamic discourse throughout their work. The 
deployment of religion encourages dialogue and provides a space where discourses of 
women’s rights work, gender justice, and Islam can convene and be debated. This thesis 
argues that the members of CEWLA navigate among the multiple discourses at play in 
women’s right work and the Egyptian society. Since religion is a vital discourse on which 
people’s social imagination is structured, it becomes axiomatic for CEWLA members to 
deploy religious knowledge. Through analyzing how CEWLA recognizes the complex and 
non-clear cut religious and secular dimensions in Egypt, I locate the deployment of religious 
discourse within the wider debate on women’s right work and gender justice in an era of 
transnational feminism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Within an era of global feminism, in which ideas and practices travel across the world with 
various objectives, reflection on the relationships between Islam, gender justice, and women’s 
activism continues to be crucial. A large body of work has problematized these relationships 
over the past decade (Abu-Lughod 2002, 2010; Brown 2007; Chowdhury 2009; Lazreg 2002; 
Mahmoud 2000, 2009; Mohanty 1992, 2003; Ong 1999; Scott 2007). However, liberal 
feminist scholarship in both local sites and the mediatized global public sphere continues to 
struggle with religious based gender rights discourses. These scholarships follow the dictum 
that Islam and gender equality is incompatible and that Muslim women’s lives and rights are 
only due to religious and cultural factors. Consequently, alternative ideas of gender justice are 
marginalized.  
Through field study, this thesis is accompanying the body of literature that contests 
above assumptions by exploring how women’s activism in Egypt can work within 
frameworks, which are rooted simultaneously in liberal secular ideas, and Islamic discourses 
of gender justice.  This literature contests the normative assumption of “secular” versus 
“religious” women’s activism, which has created a hegemonic picture of two camps each 
working against the other’s respective idea of gender justice.  
A productive venue for the objective of this thesis is to explore women’s activism 
through the work of the Non Governmental Organization (NGO) Center for Egyptian 
Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA). CEWLA is a well known organization that has been 
operating since 1995, located in one of Cairo’s many informal areas, Boulaq Dakrour and Ard 
el-Lawaa. While they initially provided women with legal awareness and assistance, the 
organization soon realized that the problems the citizens faced reached far beyond lack of 
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legal knowledge. CEWLA has since then expanded their work tremendously and their 
projects are today divided into three different sectors: social development, advocacy, and 
combating gender-based violence. With the objective to establish equity between citizens and 
to assist marginalized groups in society, of whom the majority are women and children, 
CEWLA runs programs such as psychological counseling, democracy awareness, legal reform 
advocacy, and computer and literacy training. The programs are today not only directed 
towards women, but towards families as a whole. One member told me that the organization 
has recognized that, in order to improve the situation for women, they cannot put all resources 
on women alone, but most also include men and the families. Many of their programs are 
operating within the community in which the main office is located, but their work also 
reaches out to the areas of Upper Egypt.  
The organization espouses the international human rights conventions and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) is 
a main reference. However, my experience with CEWLA reveals that their work requires 
negotiation within and across various frameworks. The findings from both formal and 
informal interviews and conversations with several members from their different branches 
highlight the myriad and imbricated positions towards women’s rights in the Egyptian society, 
particularly in relation to Islam. Behind agendas, frameworks, advocacy for law reforms, 
goals and funding proposals, this thesis asks how the organization’s members’ everyday lives 
are situated within their profession, or what the anthropologist Lila Abo-Lughod (2010) 
would call it, “the active social life of women’s rights”. This project’s fieldwork is conducted 
during the critical, however, inspiring months following January 25th  Revolution. The 
situation at the center, and the work CEWLA performed, was obviously inspired by January’s 
events. Since this project aligns with a moment of visions, hopes, and uncertainty regarding 
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Egypt’s future, the atmosphere these bring about emerges saliently from members at 
CEWLA.   
This historical moment also poignantly elucidate the clearly marked distinction between 
women’s activism in popular public debates. In the current media coverage and social media 
analysis of the 25th January Revolution in Egypt, its aftermath, and the ongoing falter 
transition to a new political order, we can discern how religious versus non-religious 
ideologies are posed against each other. The warnings and concerns, from liberal and leftist 
strands of feminism, of the Muslim Brotherhood’s possibilities of framing the new Egypt and 
manifesting Shari’a that would restrict women’s rights and take the Egyptian women’s 
movement back several decades dominate public debates. The women’s movement is 
frequently presented as a homogenous group of women with ideals deriving from liberal 
secular feminist thought, challenging Islamist’s gender ideologies.  
Additionally, in academic writing, women’s NGO work is pegged between debates and 
tensions whether or not they are secular oriented, if they can achieve political and social 
change or just maintain the status quo, and if they represent the interest of the masses or just 
liberal economic orders (Abdelrahman 2004; Badran 2009; Nefissa et al 2005; Sogge 1996; 
Kothari 1999; Deneoeux 2005; Moghadam 2009). Feminist research that seeks to understand 
women’s activism within civil society should not distance itself from these debates as they are 
closely linked to the ways in which various orientations of feminisms manifest themselves. 
However, instead of getting caught up in the polemic over who is right and who is not, the 
focus of this thesis lies in how a particular knowledge construction is maintained. Therefore, 
this study looks at the ways in which a prominent NGO in Cairo opens up a dialogue between 
women’s rights work and religion, and in particular Islam.  
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To reach the objective of problematizing the distinction of the binary secular versus 
religious based women’s activism and the aphorism that Islam is not compatible with gender 
justice, I seek to answer how CEWLA’s deployment of Islamic discourse and language can 
provide a deeper understanding of varying women’s activism in Egypt. In order to explore 
that question I initially need to identify more in detail of how the organization uses religious 
knowledge in their work. When are religious frameworks and arguments used in order to 
guide CEWLA’s different projects, and from where do these religious understandings derive? 
How are these religious frameworks used along with other frameworks? How significant is 
religion for the organization in order to reach their overall objective and what are the benefits 
and constraints in using this knowledge? 
In title of this thesis “navigating multiple sites” refers to the different fronts or 
battlegrounds, if we like, within civil society. Within these sites, CEWLA contests prevailing 
discourses with help of various strategies that engage religion. Since religion is an integral 
element of the Egyptian society, members of CEWLA perceive religious knowledge 
axiomatic within their work. All of them agree that Egypt is a country in which large 
segments of the population are closely linked to Islam, or Christianity, and their religious 
lives. 
Therefore, the thesis is an opportunity to reveal that the members of a particular 
orientation of women’s movement—NGO work—have a much more fluid way of using 
various frameworks and embodying and transferring the objectives of the NGO on the 
ground. By focusing on their deployment of Islam, this thesis critically investigates the 
attempts of categorizing women’s activism into Islamic or not, and the production of 
supposedly clear-cut gender ideologies among Egyptian women’s movements. It further 
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opens up questions about what religion and religious practice actually imply, especially in 
relation to the “secular”.  
Research Purpose and Significance 
The vast production of literature about women’s rights and gender justice in relation to 
Muslim women and their societies reveals the tremendous interest of the topic. However, this 
rich body of work should not be perceived as an indicator of the topic as overplayed since the 
economical, political, and social contexts within which discourses of women’s rights and 
Muslim women travel are in constant change. These transformations make transnational 
feminism, which is developed in order to recognize differences among women and visible 
through transnational spaces like the UN and the call for women’s rights as human rights, 
constantly face new challenges. Chandra Mohanty (2003) believes that the prominent ground 
on which to mobilize feminist practice today is an anti-capitalism and anti-globalization 
transnational feminist movement. Such movement can with feminist theory and practice 
elucidate the extensive negative effects these systems have on women’s lives, especially the 
marginalized poor, colored, and women in the Third world/South1. Another challenge for 
transnational feminism is to find the ability to actually commit to the premise of recognizing 
differences among women. How one should relate to and analyze women’s explicit various 
conditions and possibilities, identities, goals, and desires over how to shape their lives is still 
debated (Ericson and Faria 2011; Mendoza, 2002; Mohanty 2003). These conversations circle 
around the relationship between gender justice, rights, culture, and hegemonic international 
discourses and have opened up new trends and questions within which “Muslim women” 
                                                 
1
 Chandra Mohanty (2003) chooses this terminology along with Two-Third World to avoid any static use 
of language when indicating a distinction between geographic areas.   
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occupy a unique space. One of these trends, which seems to respond to new local demands 
and a growing international appeal for Muslim politics, is found in local and global networks 
and NGOs’ use of religious knowledge within women’s activism. This trend points to a 
consensus within international discourse of human rights, feminists, and local women’s rights 
projects that women’s rights and Islam must be reconciled, which is, to echo Lila Abu-
Luhghod (2009), phenomenal and worth continued exploration. It shows explicitly how 
diverse women’s activist projects are, but it also manifests the complexity of the relationship 
between “secular” and “religious” based activism.  
To investigate how CEWLA’s deploy Islamic discourse and language can provide a 
deeper understanding of varying women’s activism in Egypt, the thesis employs a theoretical 
framework of civil society along with feminist critique of women’s rights work. With focus 
on how religion is utilized, the thesis elucidates the relationships between employment of 
religion, political, and local conditions in relation to the broader international discourse of 
women’s rights.  
Conceptual Consideration  
The thesis utilizes a vocabulary in which many concepts are loaded with history, context, and 
debates. In order to position this work within the myriad of definitions these concepts contain, 
this section outlines a conceptual consideration. The categories that I spell out is the use of 
“Muslim societies” in favor over other similar terminologies, “Muslim women”, one of 
today’s most popular reference, “secular” versus “religious”, which I understand as discursive 
traditions as opposed to binary definitions and finally “activism” within NGO work, which 
should not equated with social movement activism as I will explore further below. 
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Among post-colonial feminists, liberal feminism is accused of still neglecting diversity 
within and among countries in the Middle East and for producing Orientalist knowledge about 
the region (Abu-Lughod 2001). People, groups and movements’ interests and external and 
internal political and economical forces have moreover seldom been recognized as a source 
for change. “Muslim societies”, a term which this thesis uses, is hence problematic in the 
sense that it seems to exclude features like non-religious people within a nation of a majority 
Muslim populace, or indicates that religion is the only identity reference within these cultures. 
However, with this awareness it is a concept that as opposed to other terms like “Islamic” 
allows for people themselves to define their own reality and is hence a term that subscribes to 
individuals owns agency within their societies (Bayat 2007; 2).  
Similar complexity occurs in the term “Muslim women”. Women in Muslim societies 
exhibit diversity across religious affiliation and conviction, class, gender roles, interests, 
familial relations, ethnicity, political adherent, and so forth. These differences are both 
shaping the consciousness of self and the perception of others. “Muslim women” can have 
various identity references, which also can change at different historical moments, and so can 
their religious conviction. “Muslim women” include the political Islamist to the secular and 
non-religious person and the myriad of various positions in between. 
 Anthropological studies have tried to conceptualize Islam in order to find a framework 
for studying the religion. Launay argues that as Islam is not a product of any specific local 
community, but a global entity, the challenges for anthropology is to:  
Find a framework in which to analyze the relationship between this single, 
global entity, Islam, and the multiple entities that are the religious beliefs and 
practices of Muslims in specific communities at specific moments in history 
(1992; 6). 
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One possible way of pursuing that task is to employ Talal Asad’s (1993) conception of 
Islam as a discursive tradition and consequently recognize that power must be included as a 
strategy to elucidate how some discourses are made possible and others obsolete. Talal Asad’s 
critique towards most of the earlier attempts in conceptualizing Islam is that they are done in a 
western tradition of thoughts. Religion as a category of an “autonomous essence” which is 
transcultural and transhistorical mirrors the liberal idea of religion. In the construction of the 
western, modern, secular society religion was redefined and placed separated from all sites of 
power such as law, politics, and science, something we cannot find before the nineteenth 
century. To study Islam out from this Christian-Euro centric understanding of “religion” is 
hence of limited value, or rather impossible according to Asad (1993). Islam should rather be 
understood as historically evolving set of discourses that have come alive in the practices and 
institutions of Islamic societies and must hence be understood as deeply imbricated in the 
material life of those inhabiting them (Asad 1986).  
Asad (2003) further explains that the “secular”, as part of the doctrine “secularism”, is 
formed by concepts, practices, and sensibilities and cannot be thought of as something within 
which “people gradually emancipate from the controlling power of religion” and then 
eventually achieve a secular form (Asad 1999). He further argues that religious symbols can 
be deleted from this imagined secular space for the reason that they are embedded in people’s 
everyday life. The doctrine of secularism has rather entailed administrative intervention into 
religious life so as to construct “religion”. In the Egyptian case, the state has “through its 
religious institutions redefined the location and modalities of proper religious practice as part 
of creating a modern polity” (Mahmood 2005, 77). One of the imagined proper religious 
practices was that religion should be domesticated and restricted to the private sphere, which 
is in particular interesting for any study concerned with the Egyptian Personal Status Law 
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(PSL), based on Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh. What becomes clear with this conceptualization 
of “religion” and “secular” is that secularism cannot be understood as practiced in a single 
way. Even if it is defined in the narrowest sense—the separation of religion and state—this 
has taken various manifestations even in Europe and the US.  
This analysis of “religion” and the “secular” is useful for this thesis in the sense that it 
points to the non clear-cut relationship between the two terms and that the ways in which we 
understand and define the concepts today are not neutral or ahistorical. The fluid relationship 
between “religion” and ”the secular” corresponds to the work on the ground from CEWLA. 
Saba Mahmood (2005) further applies this conceptualization in her argument that the 
Egyptian state is liberal-secular. This would be contested by many for the reason that the 
Egyptian state violates the principal division between religion and state—the fundament in the 
normative model of secularism—by financing management of religious institutions like al-
Azhar, or allowing Islam in the administrative structure and policies. Mahmood argues that 
the model of secularism that Egypt employs differentiates from the late-liberal western model. 
The Egyptian state has been deeply involved in the administration of religion and has widely 
intervened into religious practices of the Egyptian populace. These transformations since the 
colonial time cannot be argued to indicate something else than a secularization of the state 
institutions.   
Islam and religion are, based on these discussions, used continuously throughout this 
work, but without any added attributed values. To view Islam as a discursive tradition also 
makes it possible to, as Charles Hirschkind argues: 
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..distinguish between the instance and language use that is integral to material 
organization of Islamic social forms, grounded in durable and slow-changing 
historical structures and those rhetorical performances isolated from these 
Islamic traditions of reasoning and argumentation (1996; 4). 
This means that when using terms like religious or Islamic in rhetoric or arguments, it is with 
the awareness that these are discursive traditions and that the participants of this study are the 
social agents of determining what they imply.   
I now turn to the concept of activism which describes the thesis’ position towards the 
form of activism that CEWLA and its participators perform. Activism is today commonly 
addressed as collective action within social movement theory (Della Porta 2005; Bevinton and 
Dixon 2005; Melucci 1998; Buechler 1995). In that sense, activism is something that is 
organized among members who identify shared interests, beliefs, and visions on either a 
national or international basis, often interlinked (Kirk and Sikknink 1998). It can take place in 
the form of a symbolic action and in the cultural sphere and on the state and political level 
(Melucci 1998). The most visible and theorized activism today, termed as new social 
movements, are global justice movements, feminist activisms, environmental and peace 
movement, and anti-globalization/capitalism movements.  
Social movements emerge, according to Tarrow (1994), when contentious politics, or 
confrontations by ordinary people with elites, authorities, and opponents, become mounted, 
coordinated, and sustained against the powerful actors. A sustainable confrontation requires 
dense social networking, effective connecting structures, and legitimate action-oriented 
cultural frames and it is during these conditions only we are inside a social movement (Tarrow 
2011). Hence, the fundament of a social movement is collective actions of a vast number of 
individuals, which preferable grow into a mass mobilization and that can manage to maintain 
a sustained activism.  
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Activism can also be located outside of the organized social movements. A broader 
definition of the concept recognizes activism beyond the meaning as in relation to a formal 
organization or movement, or rooted in larger political and economical forces. Yvonne Braun 
(2008) critiques the false hierarchies of “legitimate” activism that is reproduced by scholars, 
mainly western, by their assumptions that women in the global South perform activism rooted 
in basic needs (survival) as opposed to women in more industrialized countries whose 
activism derive from strategic needs (rights). The hierarchy limits the way we understand 
activism and social actors, which results in a possible negligence of the actions that do not fit 
these methods of analysis. Activism needs to be conceptualized in a way in which it can be 
located in individuals’ everyday actions that foster new social networks and power dynamics 
(Deborah Martin et al 2007). The activism on a “small” scale precedes the more organized 
political one that might lead to an established formal organization or network, but is often 
overlooked as it is located in limited geographical space. Nonetheless, it can be in its full 
capacity of producing progressive change for women’s lives. The meaning of activism is 
hence much more than arranged protests, humanitarian intervention, or participatory research, 
performed by middle class Egypt. As an American activist himself expressed, “activism is 
based on the misconception that it is only activist that do social change—whereas course class 
struggle is happening all the time” (Bevington and Dixon 2005; 196-197).  
However, the activism performed by NGOs or transnational networks should not be 
conflated with above described social movements. Even though both of them can have social 
change as goal, the goal alone cannot be a reference for identifying a social movement. Social 
movements should rather be acknowledged on their actions they routinely engage—
contentious politics—with states, multinational actors, and international institution. NGOs, on 
the other hand, are the main actor within civil society, which in liberal political thought is the 
12 
 
ultimate structure towards a self-governing subject, and NGOs are encouraged by states and 
international institution to “cover up” for diluted states. Tarrow (2001) identifies the 
difference between NGOs and social movement within their behaviors, especially in the 
relationship to the state and other private or national institutions. NGOs and INGOs are 
engaging to a wider extent with the same kind of actors in order to advance their members’ 
national or international goals and to provide services to citizens whereas transnational social 
movements engage with states, multinational actors, and international institution through 
contentious politics. This analysis derives from the idea that NGOs/INGOs are operating 
independently from the state, which I explore later as contested, especially in Egypt where 
civil society and the activity of NGOs have been extremely controlled by the former regime.  
A more unambiguous distinction is the fundamental infrastructure between 
NGOs/INGOs and social movements. The main activity of the former is to run funded 
projects of various sorts, some service oriented, others advocacy or development driven. 
Whatever kind of project that is in play, it is, as opposed to the idea of social movements’ 
activity, restricted to a particular time period. Although NGOs and INGOs can confront states, 
such as compiling reports over the effects of certain state policy, and have social change as 
the main goal, this project will never sustained longer than what the donor has financed for. 
An infrastructure of this kind also limits the ability to expand. However much they proliferate, 
NGOs cannot act as mobilizing agents and expand constituency, or approach social, political, 
and economical concerns on the macro or national level (Jad 2004). Because of this 
organizational structure, along with the political idea of thought, which NGOs derives from, it 
is misleading, or rather impossible, to view them as social movement actors.  
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However, it is not impossible for several women’s NGOs, which together practicing a 
“range of activities… to better circumstances of women’s lives”, to form a women’s 
movement (Ray and Korteweg 1999; 48). To recognize such constellation as a women’s 
movement, a movement is conceptualized as a mobilization to demand certain interest or 
social changes in favor for, in this case, women. It must also possess some form of capacity to 
effect change in either legal, political, social, or cultural domains. A large number of NGOs 
would then gather on the basis of a common goal, but without an agreed agenda or a central 
coordinating body (Jad 2004). The women’s NGOs together with other actors from the 
Egyptian civil society can therefore be argued to represent an Egyptian women’s movement.     
Accordingly, even though the members of CEWLA would be considered activists even 
by a narrow definition, the form of activism the organization alone performs should not be 
conflated with the one run by social movements. This is not to say that members of CEWLA 
cannot be active in social movements on a personal level. From my experience with the 
organization I became aware of that several of the participators had social and political 
activities outside of their professional role at the organization.    
Research in Revolutionary Times: Acting Quickly in Midst of Emotions 
While writing the thesis proposal, obtaining knowledge about NGOs in Egypt, and trying to 
map the field of women’s movement in the fall 2010, I was simultaneously meeting and 
interacting with activists, fellow students, and members of organizations. We often discussed 
the current Egyptian political climate in relation to women’s activism. One topic that often 
was brought up in particular was a new law, which would increase the Ministry of Social 
Affairs’ (MOSA) distribution power of foreign funding. MOSA already controlled the 
majority of the financial aid and Egyptian NGOs could not receive funding without the 
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ministry’s approval (Abdelrahman 2004). This new law was going to close all the doors for 
foreign funding agencies to work directly with local NGOs and was basically going to 
eliminate what remained of the Egyptian civil society.  
I remembered and thought about these conversations when the field work with CEWLA 
started after January 25th Revolution in the middle of February 2011. How would I manage to 
cover all the changed conditions in which the organization now performed their work, and 
capture the emotions, hopes for the future, and all other aspects this big historical moment 
brought to the organization, in research that was not structured to do so? I decided to stay with 
the original research questions even though it was tempting to change the whole project and 
solely focus on the revolution’s impact on the NGO and women’s activism. The problem 
solved itself as the revolution was constantly present throughout the fieldwork and became 
naturally embedded in the interviews, some more emotional than others. In the first phase of 
most interviews, in which I presented myself and the research objectives, the revolution was 
not mentioned. However, it did not typically take long until the conversation slipped into talks 
about the new Egyptian society and its impact. In other interviews, the whole conversation 
started off from an ongoing debate, mentioned in the news that same day, and the interview 
developed from there.  
As I did not interact with CEWLA before the revolution, it is hard to say if the friendly, 
joyful, and warm atmosphere inside the organization’s offices is a constant, or if it was due to 
the current inspiring moment, but I was stunned by how my translator and I were met by the 
entire staff. Even though the interviews were not always scheduled in advance, they always 
arranged a meeting with one of the different branches’ directors and we were always 
welcomed to just drink a cup of tea and chit chat with the secretary, who was the former 
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director of a project addressing child abuse. Due to the rather chaotic state of the country, 
much of CEWLA’s projects were on hold and the absence of running workshops or seminars 
made the members available and more than happy to give interviews. This was on the one 
hand positive as my access to the organization was broader, but on the other negative as there 
were no seminars or workshops to attend, which was the initial intention.  
Our recurring visits at the organization soon developed into a friendly relationship 
between me, my translator, and the staff and we exchanged stories and experiences both from 
our personal lives and the current events in Egypt. We assisted them with smaller tasks, such 
as finding academic articles for their new projects about domestic workers’ rights and they, on 
their hand, gave advice for future employment opportunities.  
In terms of the NGO’s activity, I soon realized that it was limited. The projects in 
progress covered very specific topics related to revolutionary times, which varied from week 
to week. Before the referendum on March 19, 2011, regarding the constitution, their focus 
was to quickly provide the population with knowledge about the constitution, encourage 
people to use their right to vote, and to reach out with this information to the most 
marginalized communities in the country. The week after the referendum passed, the 
organization’s advocacy branch had put all projects about lobbying for reforms of the 
Egyptian Personal status law on hold, and would now instead focus on developing political 
awareness programs before the approaching parliament and presidential election in the fall 
2011. Nonetheless, the current reorganization of CEWLA’s projects did not affect my 
research negatively. It rather gave an interesting sense of how they functioning in an abnormal 
situation on a day-to-day alert. 
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Methods 
In order to explore how members of CEWLA employ religion in their work and how the 
organization in general uses religious discourses, I have undertaken both interviews and 
content analysis of the organization’s reports and publications. The thesis is based on a total 
of eleven recorded interviews with six employed members at CEWLA. The interviews are 
between thirty minutes up to two hours and most of them are semi-structured, open ended 
interviews, but a few are also informal and loosely structured conversations. In addition to the 
formal interviews with one member at a time, sometimes a visit to CEWLA ended up in an 
unstructured group discussion with 2-4 members. This gave an opportunity to see the staffs’ 
different opinions on several topics. These conversations supplemented the formal interviews 
and provided a deeper understanding of CEWLA’s work, especially in relation to the current 
situation during the revolution.  
CEWLA as an organization and the interviewed participators will be explored more in 
details later, but a brief outline in this section provides a sense of the kind of projects pursued 
by the organization and its employees. CEWLA has divided its activities into three main 
departments or programs—advocacy, social development, and combating violence. I met with 
at least one member from each department, but they were also from different programs within 
these. Seham is a lawyer and works within the advocacy program where she develops and 
writes proposals for legal reforms within the Egyptian PSL. She also has a “hotline” of legal 
awareness and assistance. Wisham works with counseling programs and provides, among 
others, therapy and counseling to girls that have married their cousins they have had 
involuntarily intercourse with. The combating violence programs also run projects on 
sensitive topics such as female genital cutting and one way of providing people with 
information about this practice is through theatre plays. Sherif is the director of the social 
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development program which, among others, conducts social research over a wide range of 
topics such as the economic and physic costs of divorce in Egypt.  
These sorts of published reports were also provided to me by the members. CEWLA has 
published a rich body of literature together with UN organs, but also with Al- Azhar. Many of 
them address issues of the PSL and interpretations of Islamic law in relation to these 
concerns. Much can found on their website and Internet, but the material they provided gave 
an easy access to this collection and showed what they believe are important topics for me to 
engage with. To complement the interviews, I content analyze this material and other sources 
they have available on their website. As CEWLA is a prominent NGO in Egypt, they are 
often seen in public media and discussions over gender topics. Journal articles and public 
interviews and statements therefore also function as a source for my analysis.  
Feminist Research: Situated Knowledge  
Particular attention in this thesis is put on the ways in which the relation between women and 
Islam is presented and analyzed in feminist research and practice. Edward Said’s Orientalism 
(1979) is crucial in the way we today perceive the earlier knowledge production of the “east” 
and deconstruct the binaries “east” and “west”. Post-colonial feminists also owe Said a great 
deal for the tool he provided which facilitated the move beyond stereotypes of Muslim 
women and gender relations in the Middle East (Abu-Lughod 2001). A criterion to detach 
from the dichotomies of “east” and “west” and the negative portrayal of Muslim women, or 
from the global South in general, as only passive, salient victims under patriarchal cultures or 
religions, and instead explore and analyze women as active, creative, resourceful, and with 
agency, is partly located in identifying theories and methods suitable for the particular 
research. The latter has considerably more space to recognize that women, men, gender, 
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patriarchy, culture, religion, and societies are complex and over time and space changeable, 
and therefore presents a more realistic picture of “reality” with better potential for social 
change.  
How to avoid methodologies that emanate from privileged male, western perspective 
has been crucial within debates over feminist methodologies. The literature has for two 
decades discussed the importance of methodologies that challenges androcentric science and 
the importance of science to release itself from the scientific knowledge that yields in sexist 
results (Harding 1991, 1997, 2008; Haraway 1988; Gluck and Patai 1991; Fonow 2005). 
These quandaries circled partly around how the modern vs. tradition binary variously shapes 
research projects that reinforce the hegemonic status of positivist science which represents 
itself as value-neutral, apolitical and universally rational (Harding 2008). The myth of the 
objective researchers was challenged and the conclusion was that knowledge is situated and 
partial and research has political interests, which became one of the foundations of stand point 
theory (Harding 2008; Wickramasinghe 2009; Harding and Norberg 2005; Haraway 1988). 
Standpoint theory does not just underlines the importance of the female subject position of 
history because of her particular perspective on reality, but also the scholar’s inclusion of her 
own perspective into the analysis. If knowledge is situated and research political the route to 
“validity, methodological rigour, and credibility” is the researcher’s account of her own 
positionality (Wickramasinghe 2009; 55).  
The process of engaging with narratives and other conducted data, and then throughout 
the project transform this information into knowledge is for a feminist researcher a trajectory 
full of responsibility that plea for ethical and political reflection. Reflexivity which is “a 
tendency of feminists to reflect over, examine critically, and explore analytically the nature of 
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the research process” (Fonow and Cook 2005; 2218) can facilitate the research to achieve the 
scale of objectivity that is possible. Reflexivity should hence be incorporated in the 
development of research question, engagement with literature and theory, the interaction with 
subjects, as well as the writing process. 
However, to take account for one’s positionality is a chore conflated with reflection 
over a complex self. A researcher, as a social subject, is a “complex web of interests, 
identification, and impositions that are related to another” (Wickramasinghe 2010; 146). In 
addition, being a researcher from the global North in a post-colonial context brings further 
aspects to take into account and in need of reflection. This is not to suggest that scholarship 
made at “home” automatically has better chances to overcome essentialist tendencies. Abu-
Lughod (2001) points to the tricky situation for many Arab feminists from the region for 
whom not just “tradition”, but also Islamism, is seen as a threat to women and how this can be 
reflected in reproducing terms that Edward Said has called the dogmas of Orientalism. These 
challenges, along with stand point theory may take into account diverse identity politics and 
ethical issues of difference and intersectionality (Wickramasinghe 2009). Being cognizant of 
the ethical issues of difference and intersectionality can help overcome the essentialism of a 
singular standpoint. 
My own positionality has circled around my familiarity and employment of critique, 
along with my own position, towards civil society and NGOs within the discourse of 
women’s rights. Keeping these feminist research principles in mind helped me understand 
how the interaction with members of CEWLA, who are passionate in their work and 
convinced they are doing the right thing, put me in an ambivalent position. While recognizing 
that the members of CEWLA I interviewed, but with whom I also have established social 
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relationships, are interlocutors of these processes I critique, they have simultaneously been the 
agents in pushing me into challenging my own stand points as they reveal the not 
straightforward route of women’s rights work. The idea that I am, due to my training in 
feminist theory and critique, equipped and capable for questioning the NGO world and civil 
society differently than many of its own participants got seriously interrupted as they are not 
just aware of the limitation of civil society, but are also the agents of negotiating the power 
structures of which they are in the midst.  Hence a significant reflection for feminist research 
is that feminist researcher cannot perceive themselves positioned outside of sites of power and 
normative structures because they employ critical theories and discourse analysis. Therefore, 
my own reflection also came to include attention towards possible tendencies to take for 
granted that I cannot get trapped within the very discourses I critique—“governance 
feminism” pointing to how educated professional women that have had time to reflect and 
analyze the reality and through their awareness seek to speak for others. In this process, 
Gayatri C Spivak’s demonstration that social theorists may be complicit to the very modes of 
cultural dominance they seek to deconstruct by assuming a subaltern “unified repression” 
(1988; 84), is of valuable account.  
Chapter Outline 
The thesis is structured in 6 chapters including several subheadings. The second chapter is 
concerned with the sites in which women’s activism travel—transnational feminism, NGO 
work, and civil society. To conceptualize these sites includes a discussion regarding the 
debates over the trend of engaging Islamic knowledge into women’s NGO work and gender 
politics. This way of performing women’s activism is critiqued from various angles and 
CEWLA’s work can bring a substantial perspective to these debates. The second part of the 
Chapter 2 reviews NGO work and how literature over Egyptian women’s activism tries to 
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distinguish women’s NGOs into secular or religious based. In terms of civil society, I find 
Gramsci’s theory of civil society and hegemony useful in order to capture the complex 
relationship between CEWLA and the Egyptian state. In chapter 3 a comprehensive 
presentation of CEWLA is provided. The aim is to situate CEWLA within the Egyptian NGO 
scene as well as arguing why the organization is a productive choice for the objective of this 
thesis. The chapter also contains a presentation of the members interviewed and their unique 
positions within the organization. Chapter 4 moves on to the conducted field study regarding 
CEWLA’s engagement with Islamic religious knowledge in relation to human rights 
discourse. In this chapter, I discuss the literature on Islamic political thought and human rights 
as compatible and read this analysis into the work of CEWLA. The chapter further includes 
the complex function of the state as an actor on civil society, which reveals that parts of 
CEWLA’s work have been focused on challenging the hegemonic religious discourse that the 
former regime produced. In the following Chapter 5, I move away from CEWLA’s approach 
to the state and the formal legal system and towards the organization’s work within the 
communities. I examine more in detail the ways in which CEWLA negotiates the many 
discourses in play in the community and how these discourses form the conditions under 
which CEWLA work. Through navigating among discursive spaces and make use of various 
frameworks and strategies, of which religion is one, CEWLA generates changes on the 
ground and questioning the social imagination among people. The concluding chapter 6 
discusses the reasons to why CEWLA make use of religious knowledge in their activism. The 
thesis provides a wide and nuanced sense of the various sites in which CEWLA operates, and 
discusses the structures of power at play within these. This creates an understanding of the 
significance of employing religious discourses in the organization’s work. Accordingly, the 
chapter is arguing that attempts of categorizing women’s activism in “religious” or “secular” 
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based activism foreclose a comprehensive picture of the political and social context of 
Egyptian society and the complex realm of civil society. Women’s activism must rather be 
explored and analyzed with a nuanced understanding of “secular” and “religious” since such 
approach reveals that, whereas CEWLA espouses international human rights conventions and 
does not pursue any form of advanced role of religion within the Egyptian society or 
legislation, religion is, yet, an indispensible feature in their every-day work.  
II. CONCEPTUALIZING SITES FOR WOMEN’S ACTIVISM 
In order to situate CEWLA’s work within the local and global discourses of women’s rights 
work, this chapter critically engages with spaces in which this orientation of women’s 
activism travel—transnational feminism, civil society, and NGO work. The aim of this 
chapter is to illuminate how the local and global elements of these sites are shaping the 
context within which CEWLA operates as well as how the organization negotiates the 
conditions they create. To understand the complex relationship between local and global 
processes, along with the Egyptian political context, is vital for the main objective of this 
thesis—to problemataize the distinction between “secular” and “religious” based women’s 
activism. The chapter begins to discuss the debates that are taking place around the initiatives 
to deploy Islamic language as a route to gender justice that currently travel in the site of 
transnational feminism. Following, Gramsci’s theoretical approach to civil society and its 
(inter)relationship with the state provides an analytical tool that can explore CEWLA’s 
complex approach to the state. The last part of this chapter discusses women’s NGOs and 
movements in Egypt within the debates of categorizing these into “secular” and “religious” 
based. The rich body of literature concerned with Egyptian women’s activism can today 
question the attempts of categorizing by historizing the concepts of secular versus religious 
and contextualize the use of the binary. 
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Transnational Feminism and Muslim Women’s Rights 
UN conferences on women fueled a mobilization across borders and women’s networking 
groups throughout the world formed various alliances in a global public space. Scholars have 
pointed to how transnational feminism in this sense was forging a better understanding of how 
women’s lives are shaped in a context in which global and local places are very much 
integrated but simultaneously remain stratified (Mc Laughlin 2004). In other words, 
transnational feminism is very much about identifying, recognizing and framing common 
interests and values across differences, the key factor to recognize since the abandonment of 
“global sisterhood”. A question to answer, then, is how the space of transnational feminism is 
impacted by the broader international politics and the neoliberal economy embedded in 
national and supranational levels of society? How do these factors influence the framing of 
the alliances? Where does difference have a place within these processes?  
No one can discount transnational feminism for its work in making women enter realms 
that were previously male dominated and challenging the masculine field of international 
relations through theory and practice. Neither can we neglect the benefits that feminist 
networking has given local women’s groups. However, feminists would do well in keeping a 
critical eye on the ways in which transnational feminism is used as an analytical or practical 
tool. Strictly, transnational feminism can be argued to stand for the myriad of various 
feminisms throughout the world, which in various forms bring their respective feminist 
demands beyond communities and boarders. It can also refer to the mobilization against the 
downsides of capitalism and globalization and the studies on how the macro-level of 
economies impact women’s lives on the micro-level (Mendoza 2002; Moghadam 2009; 
Mohanty 2003). Simultaneously, transnational feminism is the every-day embodiment of 
various agendas on the ground, performed by the interlocutors of transnational feminist 
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practices. Due to its various connotations, the term is hence an open category. By critically 
engaging with its political effectiveness and definitions, deficits and shortcomings can be 
identified, which—in turn—can facilitate the ongoing debates of how to improve feminist 
projects across borders. 
Islam and Muslim women occupy a unique space within transnational feminism and 
have sparked an intense debate within women’s rights discourse. In this first part of the 
chapter I would like to focus on the contemporary polemic over the relationship between 
religion, women’s rights, and gender justice. To spell out these discussions are significant for 
the understanding of the imbrications between the frameworks CEWLA uses in their activity 
and to explore the relationships of the local and global in which women’s rights travel. 
Initially, the chapter outlines how women started to participate with Islamic discourse in 
relation to feminist consciousness, which became a crucial part of women’s rights discourse 
in Muslim societies.  
Women entering the space of Islamic religious knowledge can be traced back to the 80s, 
even though imbrications of feminist consciousness and Islam can be found in the beginning 
of the twentieth century according to some scholars (Mir-Hosseini 2006; Badran 1995). 
Throughout Muslim societies and countries in the Middle East, Asia, and beyond, the 
question that inspired was how a woman who desires to live as a practicing Muslim, but at the 
same time enjoys equality and justice, should relate to her religion? For many women, the 
abandonment of their religion was not an option (Anwhar 2005). With a belief that Islam is 
preaching justice and disdain misogyny, and the awareness that sacred texts had been 
interpreted through a patriarchal lens, women started to reclaim their religion by, among other 
strategies, rereading and interpreting the Quran. Such a task was difficult in societies in which 
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androcentric structures were deeply imbedded. Along with questioning readings of the Quran, 
women were required to problematize the commonsense of “truths” that were holding up their 
identity and society. This was done in a myriad of ways throughout the Muslim world since 
there exist a rich variety of religious practices, beliefs, philosophies, and life structures. Also, 
because of the diverse social and political climate in Muslim societies, women were required 
to proceed with their activity in various forms (Afkhami 1995).  
This way of thinking—a gender discourse with feminist aspiration, but within an 
Islamic discourse—has partly been labeled “Islamic feminism” within academic literature. 
However, few of the women that this literature refers to would accept this label. Since the late 
80s, there has been a huge body of activist and academic literature produced, which could 
possibly be divided into a philosophical and an activist character. Individuals have utilized 
“Islamic feminism” as both a political vehicle towards social change, but also as intellectual 
process without any particular political objectives. One of the major technologies used in 
order to expose the embedded inequalities in the interpretation of Islam and uncover the 
egalitarian message is a re-reading of the Quran from a female perspective. As feminists 
strongly have argued is the female subject of prominence because of her particular perspective 
on reality (Harding 2008). This was the conviction even for “Islamic feminists” and an 
exegesis of the Quran from a female perspective would surely result in a new understanding 
of the message of the sacred text and come to terms with the stereotypes often found in male 
interpretations (Wadud 1990).  
Another strategy, often along the re-reading of the Quran was to provide alternative 
interpretations of Hadith and Sunna, and finally to clearly mark the distinction between 
Shari’a, and Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh. As the latter is a human construction that has been 
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subject for change and human reasoning, influenced by local and historical particularities 
since Islam emerged, reforms in fiqh is not to change Shari’a as many of the opponents would 
argue, but to reform the human interpretation of the law (Mir-Hosseini 2006).  
Within academic literature, the imbrications of religious belief and feminism have been 
viewed with enthusiasm, skepticism, and ambivalences. Whereas some do not see any 
obstacles of conflating a feminist subject with religious practice and gender justice and 
recognizes the discourse’s dynamism and heterogeneity (Badran1996, 2001, 2005, 2009; 
Foley 2002; Ong 1996), others claim that this form of struggle cannot be attributed as 
feminism since there are embedded inequalities in religion that never can be “reformed” away 
(Winter 2001; Majid 1998). There are those who question its effectiveness and possibility to 
include the diversity of Muslim women as all do not use Islam as an initial identity marker 
(Moghissi 2011). Scholars have also questioned the productivity of such approach as it will 
not be able to disentangle itself from controversies over the accurate interpretation (Kandiyoti 
1991, 2011; Balchin 2003, 2011).  
Over the years, the concept of “Islamic feminism” has been revisited, redefined, 
contested, and abandoned, and just recently been extensively questioned by its earlier 
stalwarts. Due to new constellations of networks and global associations, Margot Badran 
(2011) recently introduced a new concept of “Muslim Holistic Feminism” and refers to the 
emerged movement of Musawah. She argues that Musawah is communal, exclusive, and 
holistic because it only addresses Muslims as opposed to earlier forms of “Islamic feminists” 
that have had fluid relationships with “secular feminists”. Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2011) argues 
that due to the concept’s entangled relationship to political and identical disputes and 
contestations, it can no longer provide any sort of analytical or descriptive function. The two 
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concepts of feminism and Islamic, each of which are already loaded with different 
connotations and subjected to various discourses, together form a never ending debate of its 
implication. Vigorous attempts to find the accurate definition of “Islamic feminism” in order 
to encapsulate the myriad of women that in various ways seek gender justice within Islam, 
have maintained simplistic perceptions of where the demarcation should be drawn. Binary 
concepts, as Tadro puts it,  
Conceal the ambiguities and fluidity of identities, strategies of engagement and 
framing of ideas. This is not to suggest that ideological projects are not 
important, only that the ways in which actors exercise their agency vis-à-vis 
different audiences and context does not fit so neatly into one of two binaries 
(Tadros 2010; 8).  
Besides the complexity of naming certain practices and defining their boundaries, 
Islamic knowledge integrated with women’s activism has also fueled a debate over the trend 
of conflating religious discourse and human rights within gender politics. Regardless of 
organizations’ affiliations with a local or global religious network they interact with religious 
clerics and institutions in order to frame projects and agendas regarding gender equality, often 
within the discourse of rights. In terms of CEWLA, without any official collaboration with 
religious networks, they systematically interact with religious authorities and other important 
actors on civil society in order to produce an alternative Islamic discourse. This is done for 
both an educational purpose and towards social change through legal reforms.  
Abu-Lughod (2009) locates this strategy within the development of local NGOs more 
intensively highlighting of the Muslim identity of women. Even though she welcomes the 
initiative to perform feminist activity within Islamic knowledge, she urges us to reflect over 
how this translates into local contexts of Muslim societies. Her analysis starts off from the 
critique towards many of today’s human rights projects as imperial initiatives, haunted by a 
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colonial past in the vein of “white man saving brown women from brown man”. The 
civilizing mission of the colonial power recently reentered the international politics, however, 
in modified form and used in the justification of imperial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Abu-
Lughod 2002, Mamhoud 2006, Mohanty 2011). Human rights projects have also been 
subjected for doubts over their potential of being able to solve the issues of power structures 
within the societies they aim to aid, as well as the new form of “feminism governance” that is 
practiced through the myriad of NGOs operating in favor for women’s rights. The 
internationalization of women’s rights, which in Egypt is most explicit within civil society 
and the NGO world, enables educated, elite women trained in gender consciousness, to speak 
for women less privileged. She asks how the projects of delivering Muslim women’s rights 
through Islam differ from these structures and if they have managed to escape the frames of 
global feminist governance closely tied to professionalization.  
One example of how Islamic feminism manifests itself within the discourse of women’s 
rights in a Muslim society is the home-grown group of women that since 1993 calls 
themselves Sister in Islam (SIS) located in Malaysia. They profile themselves as: 
Muslim women committed to promoting the rights of women within the 
framework of Islam. Our efforts to promote the rights of Muslim women are 
based on the principles of equality, justice and freedom enjoined by the Quran 
as made evident during our study of the holy text 
(www.facebook.com/pages/sisters-in-islam). 
They represent a feminist activity which embraces liberal thoughts of question, but 
within a cultural context which requires communitarian values and local sensitivity of how to 
negotiate gender inequalities. A significant part of their work engaging dialogue with Islamic 
clerics’ and is hence producing some sort of sisterhood with men. This communitarian way to 
engage with family law has helped men acknowledge women’s exploitation (Ong 1996). 
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Following SIS’s initiative the global movement of Musawah started in 2009. With 
CEWLA’s director in the policy making body of Musawah, CEWLA will play a crucial role 
for implementing Musawha’s plan of action in Egypt. This includes the work of making other 
NGOs in the country familiar with Musawah’s framework and how one utilizes it in order to 
push the government to implement the declarations of CEDAW. Musawah hence combine 
discourses of human right together with the conviction that Islam is the source for justice and 
equality within the family (http://www.musawah.org/).  
Abu-Lughod (2009) does not question the indigeneity of these projects, yet, even if they 
are based on the idea to speak for women “from within”, we need to problematize mainly two 
components within the projects. To begin with, Musawah and SIS are receivers of mainly 
westerns funds and this make them enter economical, social, and political circuits, which are 
not always unproblematic. Abu-Lughod believes cautions over how western financial aid is 
put into Muslim reform projects needs more attention. In other words, despite these projects’ 
claims to be indigenous, they are not isolated from the hegemonic discourses and power 
relations. Neither are they secluded from the strong links to liberal political economy to which 
women’s rights are connected (Merry 2006). The second thing Abu-Lughod finds problematic 
is the usage of rights as a framework to bring justice to Muslim women, and how the sense of 
rights is framed within this framework. She wonders if any legalistic frameworks, even ones 
deriving from Islamic knowledge, can deliver justice to the complexity of women’s lived 
sufferings. In this critique, she is referring to her decade long fieldwork in rural areas of 
Egypt. The women she has met through the years are the imagined receivers of the social 
changes these rights projects aim to deliver. Abu-Lughod asks who is in the position to 
perceive women as solely legal subjects without considering them subjects of the global 
political economy. I find her analysis compelling because she indirectly addresses the more 
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deep rooted structural injustices that are a result of the former regime’s maintained neo-liberal 
economical politics during the last two decades and how women’s lives and gender justice 
have become affected by these politics. To what extent the right based projects actually can 
change women’s lives under these circumstances is an important question to ask.  
From another angle, Hania Sholkamy (2011) criticizes the same trend of employing 
religion into women’s rights activism, but has a rather different focus than Abu-Lughod.  
Sholkamy argues that the instrumentalizaiton of religion, and in particular Islam, that is 
practiced by feminists and activists within women’s rights as route to social change is highly 
problematic for several reasons. Sholkamy distinguishes between religion as a faith and 
religion as political and believes the latter should be avoided in feminist projects due to the 
problem of contesting other religious interpretations that would not do justice to gender 
relations. Religion should not be the arbitrary instrument for achieving justice and equality. 
She also addresses how religion, once used in political activities, is standardized, packaged 
and bundled into homogenized entity, which do not invite for reflection or overview. The 
reason to why this strategy nevertheless is espoused by women’s rights activists is, she 
argues, simple: “…if people are driven by faith, let us use religion to drive towards social and 
political change” (Sholkamy 2011, 48). Sholkamy further recognizes that the trend of 
employing religion into gender projects is hard to resist for the participators within women’s 
activism, but believes this global enthusiasm for shaping a “safe Islam” will backfire on Egypt 
since this processes favor conservatism and religiosity that in time might turn into the 
hegemonic way of dealing with politics. As individuals have various identity markers and 
many do not chose religion as the main navigator in life, the use of religion in politics is an 
exclusive project that results in identity politics.  
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Sholkamy (2011) seems to believe that religious discourse can be separated from the 
political sphere in Egypt and that the prospects for this project to succeed are disturbed by 
women’s activists when employing Islam in their work. A major problem with such analysis 
is the fact that the vast majority of women’s activist projects in Egypt seek social change 
through legal reforms in the Egyptian family legislation. The PSL is based on Islamic 
jurisprudence, fiqh, and is therefore difficult to approach without bringing in Islamic 
knowledge. This fact challenges Sholkamy’s distinction between religion as faith and political 
since the Egyptian context is much more complicated than such clear marked demarcation. 
CEWLA engages with religion when advocating for legal reforms and this is one of their 
main projects in which they cooperate with Islamic scholars, imams, and other religious 
authorities. Without this strategy, it would be hard to pursue the work they do. As I describe, 
CEWLA’s engagement with religion is not as one-dimensional as Sholkamy portrays it. It is 
rather an integrated part in the struggle of producing an alternative understanding of Islam in 
the midst of hegemonic religious discourses produced by the former regime and other actors. 
Confronting or challenging these discourses with “secular” ideas of equality and justice alone 
has probably limited potential to gain legitimacy and consequently success. Rather than 
packing Islam into a standardized entity, CEWLA’s work opens up a space in which 
reflection and overview of religious discourse is encouraged.   
Corresponding to Sholkamy’s concern that religious discourse as a route to social 
change is identity shaping and exclusive comes from Mustafa’s (2011). He alerts an 
Islamization of women’s rights. With a long experience of women’s rights in Egypt as the 
Project Manager of the German Technical Center’s (GTZ) project, Promoting Women’s 
Rights in Egypt, he has noticed the shift towards the significance of religious discourse within 
women’s rights projects, in particular within the debate on reforms in the PSL. The 
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compromises and confrontations between the state, religious authorities, and women’s rights 
activists bring into play the notion of an Islamization of the discourse of women’s rights, or 
human rights as a whole. Mustafa means that since the 1980s there have been attempts to 
show how some concepts of human rights are compatible with Islam, and, therefore, we need 
to realize that there is an ongoing Islamization of the discourse itself. The author seems to 
define “Islamization” as when Islam becomes the norm according to which other discourses, 
in this case the human rights discourse, must adjust itself.  
In academic debates, a comprehensive content analysis is occurring in which the 
literature examine the transformation of human rights as the standard to which Islamic 
political thought is compared. Mahmood (2003) has noticed that there is a tendency among 
Muslim intellectuals to use the liberal ideals of human rights and democracy as the norm to 
which Islamic legal thinking must prove its compatibility. While her argument will be 
elaborated more in detail later in this thesis, her argument is highlighted here in order to stress 
that it is not necessarily principles of human rights that has to verify that it coincides with 
Islamic thought, but rather the other way around.   
Nonetheless, Mustafa makes a good point that the Egyptian state has been promoting 
several reforms in favor for women, such as the khul’ (divorce initiated by the woman), and 
the criminalization of female genital cutting.  He is correct that these rights are much more 
cultural-religious sensitive as opposed to social and economical rights, of which the Egyptian 
state has continued to neglect. While the author describes this behavior as a paradoxical move 
from the state, it could also be argued that it is actually more consistent with how the former 
regime has tried to response to the international community’s hegemonic stance on what 
rights that should be promoted in the Arab world. A more critical analysis of the premises on 
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which international human rights are based and the dominant language that travels within the 
international community, dominant normative values are elucidated. The global significance 
of a modern female subject that rest on concepts of autonomy, individualism, equality, choice, 
and bodily integrity, is used as indicator to measure how civilized a country is in order to set 
up its policies towards that country (Norswourthy 2002). The reform of khul’  most be put 
into the context of  the former government’s view on family law reform as a “means of 
modernizing the country, enhancing the development process, and maintaining the support of 
international organizations that generously fund the country’s various development projects” 
(Al-Sharmani 2009; 92)2. In Morocco, scholars who have analyzed the family reform in 2004, 
claim that this was a top-down project (Bukens 2003; Elliot 2009).  The Moroccan King’s 
final ratification of the new family law, including the withdrawal of reservations to CEDAW, 
was done in order to maintain fruitful international relations with the US and EU. 
To recall Abo-Lughod’s concern over western donors who put money into Muslim 
reform projects, the polemic over what the engagement of Islam within women’s rights 
indicates, or will result in, should be analyzed in the backdrop of post-9/11. Since then, there 
has been a rapidly increased interest in finding, shaping, and promoting “moderate Muslims” 
as a strategy against “the extremists”. In 2003, the White House initiative Muslim World 
Outreach (MWO), funded mainly by USAID aimed at transforming “Islam from within” 
(Mahmood 2006; 323). It sets up programs which provides training of Islamic preaching, 
establishing Islamic schools that counter the “fundamentalist” rhetoric, and media production 
                                                 
2
 See al-Sharmani (2009) for further discussion on additional factors that motivated the Egyptian 
government to implement the khul’ law. Among others she addresses the extensive mobilization of women’s 
rights groups since the 80s and their participation in the family legislation reform process. 
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with various broadcasted radio and TV-program and Islamic talk shows. Saba Mahmood 
explains:  
The multilayered project has a singular objective; to foster what is now broadly 
called “moderate Islam” as an antidote and prophylactic to fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam” (Mahmood 2006; 331). 
 In reports published by the conservative think tank Rand Cooperation, the 
“traditionalists” are identified as the main threat to the values of democracy in our 
contemporary world. A group of divulge individuals are further labeled moderates and 
perceived as the best partner to the help the US to foster an enlightened form of Islam 
(Mahmood 2006).  
To summarize the discussion regarding local initiatives of bringing a feminist 
consciousness, there is an overall concern that a transnational appeal for Muslim politics is 
shaping these local projects. While Sholkamy (2011) seems concerned over how this will 
shape an exclusive, and in the worst case hegemonic, way of dealing with politics in favor for 
conservatism, Moustafa (2011) is more of the opinion that this is already happening. 
According to him, the human rights discourse has for two decades tried to show its 
compatibility with Islamic political thought. Abu-Lughod (2009, 2010) does not judge or put 
any attributed values to the use of Islamic discourse in women’s rights projects as such. 
Instead, she acknowledges that to recognize the need of reconciling Islam and women’s rights 
is phenomenal. In her critique, she rather points towards how “governance feminism” now 
also seems to penetrate these initiatives. Like the critique of many women’s rights projects in 
which educated professional women are speaking for imagined beneficiaries of their right 
projects, this also counts for women with Islamic knowledge. She also questions the 
effectiveness of the use of rights towards justice as there will always be “incommensurability 
between everyday life and the social imagination of rights” (Abu-Lughod 2009). She asks 
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how the projects that, by engaging Islamic knowledge, claim to be more “from within” and 
isolated from the more mainstream projects, are actually different when it comes to the 
dominant and hegemonic structures within the territory of rights.   
Reading this critique in terms of the work of CEWLA, this thesis recognizes that as an 
NGO within the complex space of the Egyptian civil society, the organization is not isolated 
from the global elements which influence the agenda over how to shape local initiatives 
regarding gender justice. CEWLA receives funding from prominent western donors and has 
extensively established networks with other transnational actors. However, the activity of 
CEWLA brings further perspective to the above discussions considering the organization’s 
vast variety of operating programs. Additionally, CEWLA projects, in particular regarding 
legal reforms, must be understood within the local conditions. Sonbol states:  
Since these societies subscribe to discourses that rely on the Shari’ah as the 
source of family law and gendered conduct, any approach to legal change that 
does not take the Shari’ah as a starting point in Muslim societies has little 
potential for success (Sonbol 2007; 60).  
PSL in Egypt is based on fiqh’ and the members of CEWLA clearly state that in terms 
of reforms, they must consult with experienced people so that the reform has a possibility to 
be approved. In this process CEDAW is the road map and guiding principles for determining 
what reforms to propose.  
Women’s Non Governmental Organizations 
In the previous chapter, NGOs were discussed in relation to activism and it was clarified that 
there is a distinction between social movements and activity taken place within civil society. 
With this conceptualization in mind, this section moves forward to the debates over women’s 
NGOs distinguished as secular or religious as well as from what arguments these definitions 
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derive. A short historical retrospective will initially explain the current wave of established 
NGOs that have taken place the last decade within the Arab world and Egypt.  
The mushrooming of established organizations, their diversity in activities, and the large 
amounts of funds mirror their significant presence in the region. However, the intense 
academic debates and the controversial relationship to the state and liberal political orders 
maintain questions about democracy, governance, and citizenship. What fueled the rapid 
increase of NGOs divides academics, but in the Egyptian case, the donor’s shift from funding 
the state to funding actors on civil society is a potential explanation. Within the development 
discourse during the raise of neo-liberalism and its anti-statist logic, the state was blamed to 
fail in several economical responsibilities. The dominant model of development in the 80s 
was therefore to favor the free market, monetary stability, and limitations of the state, which 
moreover was the main feature of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) (Abdelrahman 
2004).   
The flourishing of women’s NGOs can, along with the above analysis, be understood as 
a result of the recognition of women’s rights within the human rights discourse. During the 
first half of the 90s, women’s marginalization gained attention through several international 
conferences and campaigns addressing gender-based violence, women’s rights to 
development, and other activities which made women’s issues more visible than ever before 
(Afkhami 1995; Chen 1995; Merry 2006; Moghadam 2005; Peters and Wolper 1994). 
Conferences under the UN developed platforms with recommendation, and the adopted 
resolution at Beijing 1995 calls states to implement and promote a policy of “gender 
mainstreaming” at all levels. Big international funders from US and Europe reentered the 
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Egyptian civil society and allocated their development aid through the popular development 
project performed by NGOs.  
The diversity and types of NGOs cannot be stressed enough. To make sense of this 
myriad of activities, the academic literature has tried to differentiate between NGOs and 
common categories, which are: service oriented NGOs, advocacy groups, and NGOs that are 
organizing the society in order to identify problems and their possible solutions (Milani 
2005). NGOs are also analyzed within religious frames (Abdlerahman 2004; Hafez 2003, 
2011; Singerman 2009; Bayat 2003; Benedetti 2006).  
In terms of religious NGOs, or movements, the Islamic women’s organizations 
interspersed in the larger Egyptian Islamic revival have been a significant characterizer of the 
Egyptian civil society for the last decade. While their objective and purpose varying, they can 
be viewed as an integrated part of the developed religious ethos or sensibilities within Muslim 
societies. Many are performing similar activities as NGOs not encouraged by the Islamic 
revival, such as literacy programs, health care, legal reforms proposals, however, out from an 
Islamic teaching framework. There are various attempts to sort and differentiate these 
organizations from the ones fueled by the language of women’s rights as human rights in UN 
conferences and funded by western donors. A categorization of Egyptian women’s NGOs and 
activism into secular versus religious based has been the dominant method. Azza Karam 
(1998), for instance, argues that through a categorization of women into Islamist feminists, 
Muslim feminists, and secular feminists we can discern differences and compare women’s 
initiatives. Through these categories she then describes how they differ in attitudes towards 
gender relations and what framework they use to support their standpoints.  
38 
 
Al-Ali (2000) reads this categorization as problematic for the reason that her 
ethnography of several women’s NGOs elucidates how religious guidelines can exist even 
among women who claim they are secular. Instead of imagining boundaries between secular 
and religious, the positions should be conceived in terms of a continuum (Al-Ali 2000). This 
problematic understanding of religious subjectivity is further elaborated by Hafez (2011) who 
challenges the binary of representations of subjectivities engaged in religious practice and 
secular endeavors, deriving for the universal distinction of religion as a separate category 
from other spheres of social life. However, whereas it is recognized that religious and secular 
selves are not clearly demarcated, the discourses that guide women’s NGOs are still traced. 
The reference that often determines “religious” versus “secular” based activism is the 
framework that is used in order to structure the various projects. Al-Ali suggests that for 
secular female NGO activism, Islam is not the “only source of values and axis of orientation” 
(Al-Ali 2000; 142). The secular female activists in her study do rely more on international 
human rights conventions and a personal civil law, and oppose the implementation of Shari’a.  
Margot Badran (2009) subscribes to this definition and clarifies that as opposed to 
secular feminists who draw guidelines from multiple discourses like nationalism, Islamic 
modernists, and human rights, Islamic feminists use a single dominant discourse which is 
based on the Quran. However, the two modes, notwithstanding the differences, are 
interconnected as feminist manifestations in Egypt are complex due historical, political, and 
social changes. With large contributions to the body of work over Egyptian women’s activism 
through ethnographies and analysis, these attempts of categorizing the myriads of projects 
seems more and more misleading. By challenging the imagined demarcation between 
“secular” and “religious” activism by tracing their historicity and by problematzing the 
Egyptian social and political context, Saba Mahmood (2003) and Sherine Hafez (2011) both 
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emphasize the difficulties of realizing an analysis of Islamic female participator of the Islamic 
revival through the category of religion alone. The Islamic women in Hafez’s work with the 
organization al-Hilal, are utilizing liberal “secular” values in their development projects and 
the author argues for the concomitance of the binaries of religion and secularism in women's 
religious activism. Her work tells that the activism itself can be guided by more than just 
religious discourse even though the female participators commit themselves to Islamic 
activism.  
CEWLA is not part of the Islamic revival and was not established in order to promote a 
religious ethos in Egypt. Rather it is an organization that emerged along with the popular call 
for universal women’s rights. The very element that motivated CEWLA is hence clearly 
distinct from many of the Islamic women’s organizations. However, the ways in which the 
organization operates indeed problematizes earlier attempts of categorizing women’s NGOs 
and movements based on utilized framework. In order to explore the work of CEWLA, a 
nuanced understanding of “secular” and “religious” is needed. Similar to how Mahmood and 
Hafez could not use religion as a category alone, so too cannot “the secular” as a category 
explain the work of CEWLA.   
Civil Society  
CEWLA is operating within the debated realm of civil society in Egypt, a contemporary 
political and academic buzzword that lacks clarity. Civil society has for a long time been used 
as a form of panacea for social and democratic “problems”, and is associated with virtues 
such as community, volunteering, and active citizenship. However, this idealized realm of 
civil society is also put into question (Foley and Edwards 1996; Pratt 2005). Whereas the 
concept is vague and suffers from definitional fuzziness and is manipulated by various 
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political camps, it should be credited for calling attention to neglected dimensions of modern 
societies (Foley and Edwards 2001; 5). Further, subscribing to that civil society is a form of 
shift of power from a diluted state to self-regulating citizens, and in which civic activities of 
various sorts are expected to cover up retreated states (Sogge 1996), I am arguing that civil 
society as a conceptual framework should be used in order to disclose how it manifests itself 
and the effect it has on communities and peoples’ lives.  
One of the contestations regarding civil society, which should continue to be 
problematized, is the assumption that it is an autonomous equal sphere in which citizens 
perform activities isolated from state power. In this perception, NGOs play the role of good 
governance on a field of basic liberty and freedom of expression and assembly with the 
authoritarian state on the opposed side (Pratt 2005). However, literature debunks how 
organizations rather collaborate and interact with the state on several levels, using foreign aid 
to finance local government programs (Abdelrahman 2004; Mohanty 2011). The more 
optimistic stance towards civil society can often be traced to liberal political thought. Scholars 
anchored in liberal theory equalize the concepts of “active citizenship” (Yuval-Davis 1997) 
and a “third sector” of associationalism with civil society and view these as vital aspects of 
democracy (Abdelrahman 2004). In these spaces, autonomy and voluntarism are supported 
against state control and societal responsibility (Rose 1999). The fatal problem with this 
model is the negligence of the power relations and class divisions within these spaces. The 
liberal idea that all members of a society act out from the same conditions regardless of class, 
gender, religion, ethnicity, age, and other social differences has been questioned for decades, 
many from a feminist perspective (Fraser 1990; Ryan 1992; Pateman 1990; Yuval-Davis 
1997). A more organic relationship between the state and the civil society can be found in 
theorists like Gramsci and Bourdieu. The civil society is for them a dynamic space in which 
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exercise of power and other mechanisms can be located. Gramsci’s notion of civil society is 
the most applicable model in order to understand the work of CEWLA considering the 
particular context of Egyptian civil society and the relationship with the state.  
Gramsci’s Civil Society and Concept of Hegemony 
Gramsci (1971) has been credited for his complex model of the civil society, a space 
described as a marketplace of ideas in which the state strives to maintain its power, but also 
where social creativity and alternative social orders can emerge. His theory is therefore 
commonly used in analysis of the Egyptian civil society (see Abdelrahman 2004; Bayat 2007; 
Pratt 2005; Singerman 2006).  
In Gramsci’s theory the state acts on the two floors of civil and political society. The 
state contains the government, police, courts, and army and the civil society is describes as 
economical and institutional organisms like education, religious systems, clubs, cultural 
media, and political parties. In order to obtain recognition from larger segments of the 
population than just its own, the ruling elite must create an image as appealing to the ruled. 
This is done through the production of what Gramsci calls hegemony, defined as “the 
spontaneous consent given by the great mass of the population to the general direction 
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group” (Gramsci 2001; 145).  
Abdelrahman (2004) uses Gramsci’s theory to understand the Egyptian civil society. In 
particular, she uses his term of “passive revolution” in order to explain the attempts by the 
state and the Islamists group to enforce ultimate hegemony. Hegemony and hegemonic 
discourses are created by the rulers through the myriad of institutions, which are also viewed 
as consensus of the elementary principles that found a discourse (Abdelrahaman 2004). The 
hegemonic discourse secures the acquiescence of the ruling classes and the consent of the 
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subordinated classes to accept their subordination as normal, but also shapes individuals in 
society to reproduce these prevailing norms (Femia 1987).  
To make citizens reproduce norms in favor for the ruler is what Foucault (1977) 
captured in his concept of “regimes of truth” and theory of governmentality. Construction of 
normalized discursive ideas of how to think, act, and talk—regimes of truth—are penetrating 
every aspect of life and mind through habits, customs, and ceremonies. This is the state’s 
devising apparatus to make citizens govern themselves that corresponds to the interest of the 
state. Gramsci (2001) further explained that to the extent that the intellectuals fail to create 
this hegemony, the state falls back on its coercive methods of the political floor and 
disciplines those who do not consent. People are hence not ruled by the coercive apparatus 
alone, but through ideas, which implies that the rulers must indispensably be challenged with 
the same.  
Except for the ruling elite and the hegemonic discourse, counter hegemonies also 
emerge in this space and challenge the power of the state. Hegemony necessitates counter 
hegemony and these two are seen as “simultaneous double movements” that reciprocally 
shape one another (Persaud 2001; 49). Gramsci’s definition of counter hegemony implies that:  
It is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into 
everyone’s life, but of renovating and making “critical” and already existing 
activity (Gramsci, quoted in Marxism and Ideology, J. Larrain, 1983; 84) 
A practical element of producing counter-hegemony is hence to reframe an existing 
discourse and expand, or add to, that set of truth. This can be read in to the way in which 
CEWLA work with the already existing religious discourse within the personal law in Egypt. 
Instead of abandon the legislation, they opening up for other interpretation of the current law 
and hence working within it. 
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Gramsci’s notion of civil society should further be perceived as a realm in which the 
state with its institutions, along with all sort of organized groups of people with diverging 
interest, ideologies, and goals, struggle for their respective discourse. The concept of civil 
society is hence less “idealized” as it recognizes the space as not necessarily democratic and 
non-violent. The civil society can be as much equal and free, as authoritarian and oppressive, 
depending on the prevailing economical, political and social structures (Foley and Edwards 
1996). 
Egypt and Familial Ethos 
The hegemony exercised by the state in Egypt is a form of nationalist-patriarchal discourse 
along with corporate and economic structures of the public sector. This ideology of nationalist 
and patriarchal structure is grounded in the perception that “the regime is the only valued 
representative of the nation’s interest and that the security of the nation’s interest, and 
therefore the regime’s, is politically superior to any other” (Pratt 2005; 126). Before the 
January 25th Revolution, this hegemony has, shortly put, been challenged by student 
movements in the 1970 and 1980 and sporadic labor strikes. Additionally, the Kifeya 
movement along with other actors performed demonstrations in relation to the presidential 
election in 2005. The regime has responded in a combination of coercion and consent with the 
technique of allowing restricted space of resistance and promoting ideologies that foster 
loyalty and trust in the nation, but simultaneously minimizing divisions and contradictions 
(Singerman 2007).  
However, what can be regarded as one of the more extensive and serious counter 
hegemonies, challenging the former regime, is the Islamic social movement. In the early 
1990s, the Islamic movements controlled large parts of the civil society in Egypt. Through 
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da’wa (call to Islam) and associational work the activism penetrated all sections in society 
such as mass media, formal education, and community social service. The Muslim 
Brotherhood controlled major professional unions of doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, dentists, 
and college professors and their students (Byat 2007).  
Alternative venues for Islamic movement activism were also in the informal sector of 
familial and kin relations. Through these networks the Islamic movement mobilized women 
and men, gained financial support, and could penetrate the activism to everyday habits such as 
expressing political statements, dress codes, and educating their children. The focus on 
familial structures was also explicit in the adherent gender ideology, although with varying 
characteristics, that promoted complementarity gender roles, motherhood, and “Islamic 
patriarchy” (Singerman 2006). In the midst of the Egyptian state’s attempt to uphold its own 
discourse in order to create a docile subject, “familial relations and networks in Egypt attempt 
to create a climate or environment promoting solidarity, order, and reciprocity” (Singerman 
2006; 13). This environment generated a counter public in Fraser’s (1991) understanding and 
is what Singerman calls the “familial ethos”. Drawing from Gramsci’s counter hegemony and 
a Foucauldian vein of discourse on collective life, Singerman argues that due to the modalities 
of power sited within the family where politics occur, the family must be added to the theory 
of civil society. She asks how it is possible to not include the family as an analytical category 
within the analysis of civil society when it is so clear what an influence the family has in 
Egypt and within the region. She says: 
One cannot but note that kinship is still the primary foundation of political rule 
in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Oman, Somalia etc., 
and family politics play a predominant role even within secular or nationalist 
regimes such as Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Syria, Libya etc. Clearly, 
politics at the elite level is infused with kin relations, as the rise of Gamal 
Mubarak in Egypt and Bashar al-Asad in Syria demonstrate. Why is it, then, that 
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most scholars consistently fail to see significance of the family and deny it place 
within civil society? (Singerman 2006; 7-8) 
 It is within informal networks that CELWA performs much of their work and on a daily 
basis interact with the structures and norms of the familial ethos. In terms of religious 
deployment, the participators talked about how religious arguments are used within familial 
disputes, particularly when it comes to treatments of one’s wife and Islamic principles of 
divorce and inheritance. To include the familial ethos within civil society is significant for the 
prospects of capturing the many sites in which CEWLA tries to produce awareness and create 
harmony in order to improve women’s situations. To understand the familial ethos 
relationship to civil society, Singerman (2007) further refers to legal pluralism. Legal 
pluralism: 
…is a situation in which two or more legal system coexist in the same social 
field, where legal system is defined as the system of courts and judges supported 
by the state as well as non-legal forms of normative ordering (Merry1988; 870).   
As will be elaborated later in the thesis, CEWLA has found the site of the familial ethos 
in which an alternative normative ordering is already at play. The organization uses the legal 
pluralism in order to incorporate their principles of rights, deriving from their framework. The 
members of the organization explain how CEWLA many times is solving issues with families 
from outside of the state controlled legal system and that religious language are often used 
along with principles of human rights.  
In this chapter, different sites of women’s activism has been illuminated, discussed and 
analyzed, which will in the subsequent chapters facilitate to capture and understand the 
imbricated use of different frameworks within CEWLA. The aim has been to critically engage 
with debates over transnational feminism, civil society and the categorization of women’s 
NGOs in Egypt, and to open up perspectives that CEWLA’s work brings to these debates. The 
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next chapter is focused on CEWLA as an organization in order to give a comprehensive 
picture of the objectives, projects, and methods employed along with a presentations of its 
interlocutors.  
III. CEWLA: BEYOND LEGAL AWARENESS 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the organization of CEWLA and to discuss how the 
organization’s situates itself within the vibrant context of Cairene women’s NGOs. The 
chapter also presents the interviewed participators, presents their position within the 
organization, and in what projects the interviewees are currently working. The objective is to 
explore CEWLA’s unique position within transnational feminism. Additionally, to discuss the 
organization’s role within international women’s rights work that has been in play over the 
last two decades. Finally, the chapter discusses why CEWLA is an interesting actor to look at 
for this thesis’ obejctive—to explore the relationship between religion, women’s activism, and 
gender justice.  
Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance 
In 1995, a legal awareness project for women was developed by UNICEF together with four 
Egyptian female lawyers. Following this project, these lawyers, of which one is CEWLA’s 
current Director Azza Suleiman, decided to continue legal rights organizational work and 
started CEWLA. Since then, the small center has expanded and is today operating in Upper 
Egypt and two informal districts in Cairo located next to each other—Boulaq Dakrour and 
Ard el-Lewaa. CEWLA’s mission is to address violations of women’s rights and enable 
women’s legal, social, economic, and cultural rights (www.cewla.org). These missions are 
pursued with practical methods like the promotion of legal reforms, women’s empowerment, 
and combating gender-based violence. Additionally, CEWLA also runs more development 
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oriented projects, which are working beyond the right based perspective stated on their 
website (Abu-Lughod 2010).   
Boulaq Dakrour, in every day speech “little China”, and Ard el-Lewaa are two of 
greater Cairo’s informal areas and home to for over five million people. The process of urban 
informalization began in the sixties and seventies. During this time, Cairo, as well as the other 
major Arab capitals, witnessed the emergence of a peripheral form of urbanization by private 
actors. This urbanization developed outside and regardless state's building laws and 
regulations, especially for what concerned the prohibition of converting agricultural land into 
housing plots. Informality has been the solution to the housing needs of lower and middle 
classes and, according to a recent study published in 2000, informal areas represented at the 
end of the nineties about 53% of the built residential surface of Greater Cairo and hosted 62% 
of its inhabitants (Kipper 2009).  
Perception about the informal areas as chaotic, unsecure, poor, resort for 
fundamentalists, and an economical burden for society, promoted by media and emphasized 
by government and policy makers has been contested by authors such as Singerman (1996). 
Singerman shows a dynamic and diverse characteristic of these neighborhoods, hosting 
population from a wide range of different sectors. Boulaq Dakrour and Ard el-Lewaa, and 
other informal areas, do not host only the urban poor, but also middle class young, educated 
families, university students and public sector employees in search of an accommodation at 
reasonable prices. The expansion of residential informality is a global phenomenon and not 
due only to rising poverty levels, but has been fostered by the combination of a series of 
deliberate policy choices as well as of market dynamics, which were not properly readdressed. 
In Egypt, studies also show that areas most residents perceive their neighborhood as relatively 
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safe environments, with occasional nuisances such as traffic accidents, hustling, or 
harassment. This is evident in the freedom of mobility for women and children, the unlocked 
doors and windows, and the types of accidents reported (Kipper 2009).  
CEWLA is located on one of the wider streets of Ard el-Lewaa, locally called sherah el-
magnona—the crazy woman’s street. Even if the street is relatively wide for the area, the 
vegetable and chicken vendors, cars, tuk tuks, donkey carriages, and lots of people make the 
street crowded, still, in a friendly way. CEWLA’s premises are located on the second floor in 
a unmarked building called “the tower”.  
Since its founding, CEWLA has expanded both the numbers of approached topics and 
target groups. Through their early legal awareness projects, the organization soon discovered 
the extensive marginalization of a large segment of the population. When the organization 
started to encourage people to litigate, they realized that citizens lack the legal documents 
needed for such purposes. Consequently, CEWLA began projects that would help these 
individuals obtain birth certificate and IDs. This process was rather complicated since many 
of these individuals’ parents did not even have marriage contracts. Each case took between 3-
5 years before the documents were in order. However, through such projects, CEWLA 
worked closely with the community and obtained broader experiences and knowledge. 
Simultaneously, CEWLA gained trust from the people. This trust facilitated CEWLA’s work 
extensively since the organization could identify new problems that the citizens faced and 
develop new projects in order to meet the people’s needs. 
CEWLA is in the responsible hands of a council of six boards of trustees. The President 
of the board is Fatima Al Khafaji, who has long experience of development and women’s 
issues. The organization’s Director, Azza Suleiman, is also well known in the transnational 
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realm of women’s NGO and a member of the prominent network Musawah. CEWLA’s 
administrative tasks are divided by three units. The International Relations unit handles the 
connection with contemporary and potential donors and is responsible for the relations with 
local and global organizations and networks. The Administrative and Financial Affair unit 
builds the organization’s financial rules and regulation in accordance with the accountant 
standards. It is responsible for the follow-up process of the boards of trustee’s records and the 
operating programs. Additionally, the unit controls the connection ties to MOSA. The 
Information unit deals with the organization’s work as sources for research, studies, archives, 
and information stores regarding women and children. It is also the public information unit, 
which operates relations with the media.  
CEWLA’s projects are implemented by three main programs: social development, 
combating gender-based violence, and advocacy. To name a few of CEWLA’s projects, the 
center provides computer and literacy courses for adults, democracy and political awareness 
projects for the youth, counseling for women and families. The organization also develops 
and writes proposals for legal reforms, mainly within Egypt’s family legislation. The center 
runs workshops, roundtables, seminars, and trainings for decision makers, religious 
authorities, and for other organizations and individuals. In other words, their work is 
extensive and diverse, which makes their role in society multifaceted. The social development 
department can be viewed as a link of information from the grassroots to policy makers while 
the advocacy projects’ perform more of an activism towards legal reforms. CEWLA conducts 
their own social research and cooperates with scholars and universities. Moreover, they 
publish reports and documents about different matters and provide a space in which various 
actors can discuss these topics in public. To pursue the organization’s objective, CEWLA 
employs methods that are inventive and varying. Among others, CEWLA uses media of both 
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radio and TV. The center provides training and education to youths and public employees and 
educates teachers in adult teaching techniques. In order to attract as many as possible and 
simultaneously achieve sustainable results, CEWLA carefully chooses what methods that 
should be used in each situation and location. For instance, when addressing topics such as 
female genital cutting in Upper Egypt, the organization uses theatre plays, which address the 
physical harm this practice can cause girls and women. One CEWLA member said that this is 
a fruitful method to attract people’s interest coincidentally as mediating the important 
information.    
By describing itself as a grass root, human rights oriented organization that advocates 
for women’s empowerment and equality, CEWLA follows the dominant language within 
international women’s rights discourse. CEWLA is one of hundreds of organizations in Egypt 
with similar profile. Akin to CEWLA, many of these organizations view state legislation as a 
promising venue for creating positive changes for women. This makes women’s NGOs put 
major focus on advocating for legal reforms. The Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights 
(ECWR) is one of the prominent NGOs espousing a right based framework and the 
international human rights. The organization uses the liberal language of women’s rights as 
human rights and views law as the institution through which women’s status in society will be 
enhanced. On their website (2011) ECWR states: 
…Improving the monitoring of human, legal and political rights of women and 
working on women access to comprehensive justice and political empowerment 
is of special importance to measure accurately Egypt progress toward fulfilling 
its commitment in the field of human rights and gender equality. 
(www.ecwronline.org) 
As opposed to some other women’s organizations, ECWR accepts funding from, among 
others, USAID. Since the war on Iraq, CEWLA, along with other NGOs, has chosen not to 
accept funding from US government institutions. Furthermore, ECWR assisted the National 
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Council for Women (NCW) before the election in 2000, in order to support female candidates 
(Zuhur 2001). ECWR is further one of few women’s organizations mentioned at the NCW’s 
website (Abu-Lughod 2010). The direct collaboration between state feminism and some 
women’s NGOs has created a divide split among Egyptian women’s organization. While 
some organizations claim that the most pragmatic way of combating atrocity of women’s 
rights is to work within the patriarchal structure of the state itself, others view this cooperation 
as an extended arm of the state. For these critical NGOs, the state continues to underpin the 
structural gender injustices in the Egyptian society and demobilizes the women’s 
organizations’ initiative through its strict legislation that monitors the civil society (el-Mahdi 
2009). NCW has received vast critique for not representing the Egyptian women’s needs. 
Instead of encouraging a women’s movement in Egypt, NWC is argued to havd used its 
authority to form a women’s movement that would suit the state’s interest.  
CEWLA has a careful approach towards the Egyptian state and state feminism. Even 
though they engage with state officials in educational manners and train government 
representatives in human rights, al-Azhar is the only state institution with who CEWLA 
systematically cooperates. 
New Woman Foundation (NWF) takes on a rather different stance than ECWR. Instead 
of pointing their projects explicitly towards development, they are more research oriented and 
create a space in which the organization launch campaigns and conduct studies. The center 
facilitates for, and support, women to organize themselves and provides trainings for other 
community based organizations. Since the organization has an outspoken feminist profile and 
does not hesitate to file petitions against the state, it is considered one of the more radical 
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NGOs in Egypt. In their objective description they include economical and cultural rights as 
significant for women’s equality, which is absent in ECWR’s self-description.  
Another research oriented organization is the Women and Memory Forum (WMF). 
WMF is a center for academics, activists and researchers that are concerned with how Arab 
women are negatively represented in the cultural sphere. The participators work towards 
providing an alternative historical knowledge from Arab women’s perspective. Through this 
method they hope to change dominant and negative images of women in society which “can 
be used for raising awareness and empowering women” (www.wmf.org). WMF has carried 
out conferences, publications, film shows, workshops, and collections of women’s oral 
history. They have organized commemorative conferences on pioneer Egyptian women and 
are re-writing fairytales through a women’s perspective to challenge the prevalent 
representation of women. As most other organizations, WMF relies on foreign funding from 
the private sphere, However, the center avoids state connected donors.  
Empowerment, expressed in various forms, is continuously returning as a main 
objective among women’s NGOs. In women’s rights discourse, this has become a global 
buzzword. However, the concept of empowerment has at the same time been questioned by 
critical voices. The critical voices argue that empowerment derives from a liberal 
understanding of a self-governing subject and often fails to address the substantial problems 
women are facing. The Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women 
(ADEW) is working to empower women economically, politically, socially and legally. For 
ADEW, the route towards women’s empowerment is through micro-credit loans, legal 
documents, literacy courses and life skills training (www.adew.org). ADEW started the 
organization by providing women with micro finance loans within a Cairene garbage 
53 
 
community in Muqattam. Today, ADEW has fifteen offices in five different areas in Cairo 
and has 200 employees. Additionally, the organization addresses domestic violence and has 
organized women’s shelters and launched awareness campaigns. To address domestic 
violence through such methods is to follow the UN framework, which has become a global 
trend among women’s NGOs (Abu-Lughod 2010).  
In order to work together with other organizations, many women’s NGOs are also 
members of networking groups. In such groups the NGOs can discuss and develop common 
goals and interests. Network of Women’s Rights Organizations (NWRO) is an association for 
NGOs working in the field of women and family rights. The network was formed in 2005 
with the initiative to gather shared visions and build a framework for action among those 
concerned with family legislation. NWRO's ultimate vision is a conscious society, established 
on the values of citizenship, social justice, and human dignity, which respects women's rights 
and the family. They seek to build an effective, coherent and powerful alliance of NGOs, in 
order to create an enabling legal environment to maintain justice and women's rights, 
especially in the area of personal status and family affairs. For CEWLA this is a space in 
which the center can interact with organizations interested in the promotion of reforms in 
Egyptian PSL, and exchange ideas and experiences in this process. 
The vast majority of women’s NGOs in Egypt is established in order to implement 
justice through a right based framework and motivated by international human rights 
conventions. The majority is also driven by terms like empowerment, development, and 
equality. However, they form a vibrant scene of women’s organizations. Different ethical 
convictions and self-images guide the organizations when they negotiate the international 
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space of women’s activism. These various self-images are also delineating various stances 
towards the Egyptian state and international donors.  
For this thesis’ objective, the ways in which CEWLA addresses women’s lives and 
women’s familial relations, and the deployment of religious knowledge, make the 
organization an interesting actor to explore. Since CEWLA systematically engages with al-
Azhar, it is a promising source for the objective to understand the use of various frameworks 
within women’s rights work. In 2008, CEWLA published a report in cooperation with the 
prominent scholar Dr. Amna Nosseir in Islamic philosophy at the al-Azhar University and 
UN. The report (CEDAW and Islamic Shariaa, 2008) argues that Shari’a is to 95% 
compatible with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW). Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (2010) visited CEWLA during her 
fieldwork on ”the social life of women’s rights”, in order to clarify the ways in which religion 
has gained terrain within women right’s discourse in Egypt. Her conclusion is that CEWLA’s 
employment of religion is a response to the broader political and cultural climate in Egypt 
today and to people’s general reserved stance towards conventions developed in a western 
context. CEWLA’s publication regarding CEDAW and Shari’a was an attempt to contest the 
assumption that CEDAW aims to destroy the construction of the family and undermine 
religion. For these reasons, I chose CEWLA as my research base in order to more extensively 
explore how the organization and its members experience the deployment of religion, why 
they make use of a religious framework, and from where their particular religious discourses 
derive.  
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Actor in Global Civil Society 
CEWLA also operates as an actor in global civil society and transnational feminist 
networking. CEWLA is well known among organizations and women’s activists groups in the 
region and beyond. Their name circulates throughout UN reports, global networks, seminars, 
Internet forums, media, and other activities about women’s rights and lives. Director Azza 
Suleiman is, together with prominent scholars and activists, a member of the highest policy-
making body International Advisory Group at Musawah. Musawah is a global movement for 
equality and justice in the Muslim family, profiling itself as a network that  “pluralistic and 
inclusive, bringing together NGOs, activists, scholars, practitioners, policy makers and 
grassroots women and men from around the world”. They hold the principle of Islam as the 
source of justice, equality and fairness between the spouses.  
In attempts to form a similar family legislation in countries of the MENA region, 
CEWLA’s networking includes collaboration with women’s organizations in Syria, Lebanon, 
Morocco, and other countries in the region. CEWLA interacts with activists and members in 
these countries to exchange ideas and strategies within their common field of interests and 
projects. CEWLA further links these regional initiatives to the space of transnational feminist 
networking when attending global seminars and conferences. The experiences and knowledge 
obtained from these gatherings are then linked back to CEWLA’s domestic activities within 
the local communities of Egypt. In this function, CEWLA is a networking connection for 
local participants and NGOs, regional women’s rights activist, and global discourses 
regarding gender politics and women’s rights.    
Transnational networks are argued to ground their alliances on shared values or action 
plans that in turn often are guided by the international norms developed by states. The 
56 
 
international human rights convention is an example of such international norm through 
which transnational networks found legitimacy for creating coalition for action and social 
change. Transnational networks function as a promoter of international norms and can, in 
some cases, teach these norms to reluctant states (Thomas 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1999). 
Corresponding to this analysis, CEWLA’s feminist transnational networks use CEDAW 
conventions to find legitimacy to pressure states to take action towards discriminations and 
abuses of women’s rights. Simultaneously, CEWLA and other actors come together and form 
various networks based on shared values and beliefs. CEWLA has established connections 
with groups like Musawah originating from Malaysia, and Diakonia, a humanitarian 
organization initiated by four Swedish churches on a missionary project. Musawah is 
concerned with Muslim family law and Diakonia with development. Since the two groups 
have clearly distinct goals, they frame their plans of actions differently. Notwithstanding 
strategic differences, CEWLA and these groups have been able to locate shared values among 
each others. The overarching values within CELWA’s large network are therefore not always 
clear-cut and straight forward. Moghadam (2009) differentiates between feminist movements, 
Islamist movements, and global justice movements and identifies their varying characteristics 
due to shared values, objectives, and frameworks that guide the projects. My study, so far, 
shows that these categories set up by Moghadam are more misleading than forging an 
understanding of various transnational networks. CEWLA is a good example of how complex 
transnational networks can be structured and points to how demarcation of this kind is futile 
as the exceptions too often seem too many.  
CEWLA’s role in global civil society is further reflected in their connection to donors 
from Europe and the US. CEWLA was able to expand their projects when they got their first 
foreign funding from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). With this 
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capital, they could start legal awareness programs in 18 other governorates around the 
country. Additionally, they completed the first map of the neighborhood of Boulaq. 
CEWLA’s projects are today financed by several other donors like the Ford Foundation and 
Dutch Oxfam, among others. Ford Foundation profiles itself as promoter for democratic 
values, poverty reduction, international cooperation, and human achievements. Their explicit 
approach towards women may be exemplified by their programs on sexual and reproductive 
health and rights. Oxfam Novib (2011) states at their website that: 
Justice is that all people, regardless where they are born or live should have the 
possibility to build their own independent livelihood. Therefore is support to 
development countries a matter of justice. (http://www.oxfamnovib.nl/) 
Foreign funding raises questions about an organizations’ autonomy and the donors’ role 
as stakeholder within the global capitalist economy. Since foreign donors always have 
priorities associated to their funded projects and certain conditions that must be signed by the 
organizations in order to receive aid, an NGO’s ability to autonomously frame their projects is 
arguably restricted (Abdelrahman 2004). According to some critical voices (Marcussen 1996, 
Kothari 1988) foreign funding (mainly from global North) enables these donors’ to exert 
power over recipients, which give them structural influence within these societies. Noha, who 
is responsible for CEWLA’s international relations, refers to the organization’s donors as 
reliable partners with whom CEWLA shares the same goals. However, even though 
negotiating is sometimes necessary, she does not perceive the donors as superior, or as 
someone who is determining their projects. She describes CEWLA and NGOs in general as 
the bridge between actors on “the outside” with the aim to reach the Millennium Development 
Goals, and the people in need on “the inside”. When I asked her how she felt about the 
speculation of international donors as determining the frameworks and agendas of NGO work 
in contexts unfamiliar to those donors, she responded that such character of the donor will 
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reflect quickly on the organization. I referred to a Swedish women’s organization that has 
contact with several local NGOs in Egypt and which has a clear objective to promote and 
advocate for a legislation that is not influenced by religion. The Swedish organization has the 
strong conviction that women’s emancipation will only be reality with a complete “secular” 
law. I asked Noha for her opinion about donor organizations that try to set the agenda for a 
society very different from their own. She knew about the organization I talked about and said 
that some donor organizations do not have a good reputation. The recipient NGO of such 
donors would not survive in the community very long. The Swedish organization could 
probably be an instance of that, but she was not sure. 
The counterargument to the critical voices of donor dependency is based on the liberal 
economy idea of the free market and that access to a vast variety of alternative donors brings 
negotiating power to the NGOs. An instance of such an approach would be that CEWLA is 
careful from who they receive financial aid. Noha said that the red lights for CEWLA are US 
governmental donors, like USAID, and Jewish, or Israeli organizations. However, every new 
donor is carefully examined in terms of from where they receive money, what other projects 
they fund, and what aims and objectives they pursue. To not receive money from US 
governmental institutions is a democratic decision made by the organization’s staff and the 
board of trustees. The decision is made due to the ongoing war in Iraq. Noha explained, 
without any details of exactly what year, how the American Embassy in Cairo contacted the 
organization and offered financial aid. Before the war in Iraq, CEWLA had received funding 
from the embassy, but US current foreign policy changed these conditions. At the same time 
as the offer from the embassy, MOSA had rejected several of the center’s proposals. 
Consequently, CEWLA went through a difficult economical period when salaries were cut 
and staff had to leave. Despite the hard economical condition, the majority of the members 
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voted “no” to the offer. Even though they needed every dollar, Noha wrote an email rejecting 
the money.  
Since CEWLA already embraces international human rights frameworks, pursues the 
donors’ objectives, and fulfills the conditions for receiving aid, their projects are probably 
independently delineated just as Noha says. While CEWLA is a well known organization with 
long-time experience and presence within their community, the situation is certainly different 
for a smaller organization with other guiding frameworks, rather than the hegemonic ones. 
The strong position CEWLA has within Egyptian civil society and among international 
donors definitely enables the organization’s ability to say no to donors who do not correspond 
to the organization’s self image. Again, these are not the same conditions in which smaller 
organizations are operating. CEWLA’s ability to make funding choice is still conditioned and 
situated within the structure of the global capitalist economy, developmental goals, and power 
relations. Their possibility to choose among donors is only within the frames of current 
interests of the donors. An NGO’s autonomy, according to Robert Hyden (2002), is a mirage 
that obscures the interests of powerful states, national elites, and private capital. CEWLA and 
its donors is as much a consequence of deeply unjust structures within and between states and 
a mirror of the current global political climate. CEWLA’s experience of a space of choice 
would probably change significantly if it took on a more radical approach towards 
contemporary political economical processes, or challenged the liberal language of human 
rights. It is the rules of liberal political economy that set the conditions for actors on global 
civil society. The normative values deriving from liberal political thoughts are hence 
marginalizing alternative ideas of social justice and equality.  
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Members of CEWLA 
The director of CEWLA is the Egyptian lawyer Azza Suliman, who also is one of the co-
founder of the organization. The center’s staff is predominantly women from their late 
twenties and forties. There are many lawyers at the center, but also members with degrees in 
literature, language, and computer science. Usually, the center attracts many volunteer 
workers both from Egypt and beyond, but as the situation during my fieldwork was abnormal 
due to the revolution, there was only one Egyptian law student volunteering at the time.  
My initial contact was with Sherif, the director of the social development program, and 
he gave an introductory interview with foundational information about the organization and 
its objectives. He then offered to put me in contact with the directors of other programs and 
projects. However, Sherif remained my main contact and informant during fieldwork and was 
the person who mainly arranged meetings and interviews. The director of the organization, 
Azza Suleiman, was unfortunately not available as she travelled most of time during the 
period of the fieldwork. I saw her only once during an interview, but never got a chance to 
talk to her directly. 
After the first meeting with Sherif, I was able to approach the main questions of this 
project with him and other members. In total, I met with six participants from all different 
programs and sub-projects within these. After two interviews with Sherif, I met with 
Gawaahar, a lawyer who was currently starting up a new project about domestic worker 
rights, ran by the advocacy program. She had also been directing legal training for community 
mediators in areas of Egypt where disputes are solved outside of the law. CEWLA trains both 
mediators, and lawyers in communication skills, how to solve disputes in a peaceful way, and 
human rights. In addition to a formal interview with Gawaahar, I helped her in her search for 
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articles and reports concerning domestic labor situation in Egypt and we interacted several 
times during my visits at the center.  
My third informant is Noura. She has been a lawyer for eight years and is the assistant 
director of the combating violence program. At the moment, she is the manager of a project 
for abused women and deals with sensitive topics such as domestic violence, topics that many 
people have difficulties to talk about in public. The combating violence program also runs 
projects that facilitate for women to pursue a divorce by helping women to get an employment 
and secure economic wellbeing. One reason for staying in an un-happy marriage is because 
many women would be stranded without their husband’s financial support and CEWLA aims 
to prevent such situation.  During our conversation, Noura expressed conviction that CEWLA 
makes progress in society, even though it sometimes feels like they are pushing a big rock. 
Wisham graduated from a language program at Aswan University and has been with CEWLA 
for one year. She is working in the counseling projects within the overarching combating 
violence program. I made two interviews with Wisham, but met her at several time under 
informal conversations at the center’s premises.  
As briefly introduced, Noha is responsible for international relations and translation. 
She started as a volunteer, and got employed a few years ago. She writes all the funding 
proposals, maintains contact with their donors, and translates report and documents to the 
other staffs. Seham Ali, a dedicated and professional woman with a lot of knowledge, is the 
last informant I met during one interview. She is also a lawyer and has been at CEWLA for a 
couple of years. She works within the advocacy program, which is lobbying for legal reforms, 
but she also has a “hotline” for legal assistance and awareness. As my research demonstrates, 
these participants mirror divergent stances and experiences towards Islamic discourse and its 
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role within the organization’s work, and reveal the diverse characteristics within the 
organization as a whole. 
Locating CEWLA within Women’s Activism and NGO Work in Egypt 
CEWLA emerged in 1995, the same year as the fourth world conference on women took 
place in Beijing under the UN. The adopted resolution at that conference calls on states to 
implement and promote gender mainstreaming at all levels, the practical tool to encourage 
gender equality, social change and empower women. Women’s rights as human rights were 
recognized within the international community during this decade and took us to a new era of 
NGO activism and stimulated western feminism to move beyond its domicile (Abu-Lughod 
2011). Egypt has been well integrated in this development and the women’s rights language 
gained national terrain during the preparations and hosting of the International Conference on 
Population and Development in 1994 and the participation with delegates in Beijing the year 
after. The conferences, however, fueled disputes over the ways in which these transnational 
spaces were used in order to promote Western agendas and on what premises the concepts of 
justice, rights, and equality were grounded (Ong 1996). A universal feminist project based on 
these western-originated concepts was subjected to critique by feminist theorists, minority 
groups, and religious communities.  
In Egypt, the debates manifested themselves as polemic over how gender justice should 
be approached that still could be perceived to derive from an Egyptian authentic perspective. 
Al-Ali’s (2000) study of secular women’s activism in the middle to late 1990 reveals how the 
activists were pegged between political and cultural discourses and blamed, by mainly 
“Islamists”, to embody an extended arm of western interests. Ali argues that the activists’ 
attempts to fit into a picture of an authentic Egyptian culture only reinforced the “Islamists” 
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false idea. The US historian Margot Badran (1995) contests the accusation of feminists and 
women’s movements in Egypt as western by pointing to the country’s history of feminists 
activism interconnected and shaped by the independence and liberal movements in the 1920s 
and the formation of the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), headed by Nawal el-Sadaawi. She 
argues that to anchor feminism in a certain location is a political project deriving from a 
particular understanding of culture as static, or from a need of perpetuating the construct of 
“west” and “east”. Egypt has appropriated and woven “alien elements” into a vital indigenous 
culture (Badran 1995;32).  
With the risk to fall into the reinforcement of just another form of an authentic Egyptian 
culture by following Badran’s analysis, Lila Abu-Lughod (1992), instead explores the sites 
where the “Islamists”, in their vast variety, and Egyptian feminism meet. She argues that the 
two have more in common than actually recognized. The two main features that differ are 
sexual independence and public freedom, but the Egyptian feminists’, who in this analysis are 
the female media elite, advocacy for women’s rights to education, to work, and the embracing 
of the bourgeois marriage are gingerly questioned by the “Islamists”, even though these are as 
much from western liberal feminist thought as the former.  
Ellen McLearny (2010) makes an insightful comparison between the Egyptian Islamic 
thinker Heba Rau’uf Ezzat’s scholarship on gender relation in Islam and Wendy Brown’s 
description of liberal family values. Ra’uf, visible in both national and international public 
spaces, draws on Islamic jurisprudence and religious theology from both modern and pre-
modern time, delightfully conflated with liberal, feminist and secular theory, and has been 
credited for being a catalyst for serious change in Islamic thought. While she argues for the 
family as the core of political unit in the Islamic umma she corresponds with secular liberal 
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thoughts that place the religious within the private domain. Ra’uf’s ideal of society 
incorporates democracy and freedom of speech and describes the family built upon gender 
hierarchies. This approach is identical with Brown’s picture of liberal family values, which 
concentrated hierarchies, dependencies, and duties to structure the realm of intimate relations 
and equality, freedom, and rights to the sphere of politics (McLearny 2010). Further, 
McLearny points to another example of when Ra’uf and liberal thoughts meet by pointing to 
the conversation between the female Islamic thinker and the outspoken Egyptian secular 
feminist Nawal El-Sadaawi. They have noticeable distinct ideas of the path towards women’s 
emancipation, but are both subscribing to liberal thoughts of rights, equality, democracy, and 
justice as feminist ideals (McLearny 2010).  
Over the last decade, the Egyptian context for women’s rights work and NGOs have 
been going through a transformation and Abu-Lughod identifies three shifts in the Egyptian 
society: the governmentalization of women’s rights through the NCW with the former 
president’s wife Suzanne Mubarak at the front, the increased imbrications with religious 
institutions and discourse, and the association with the cooperate world. The main accusation 
for being western allied, anti- Islamic, or not serving Egyptian’s interests is mainly received 
from the former regime and not religious groups or communities. I was told that CEWLA has 
been seriously harassed by the secret police last year as the director, Azza Suleiman, partook 
in the April 6th demonstrations. The same member tells me that it has been the state that has 
produced the picture to the public of CEWLA as a traitor with the aim to impose western 
ideas on Egyptian society.  
Maha Abdelrahman (2009) sees the same tendencies from the Egyptian state towards 
human rights organization by employing a nationalist discourse. The former regime’s 
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antagonistic position towards human rights groups accused them for being an extended arm of 
western powers, which undermined Egypt’s sovereignty. The organizations were blamed for 
producing fabricated reports of human rights violations in Egypt and for creating sectarian 
splits by asserting the state’s discrimination against Copt’s and Shia Muslims. Foreign 
funding has, furthermore, been viewed as an act of betrayal and a neo-imperialist project 
aiming to consolidate western economical domination in the country. With these arguments, 
the former regime has been able to justify its protection of the country’s security and 
sovereignty, partly by tightly controlling the civil society and its financial recourses. MOSA 
has through various laws not just placed NGOs in categories of either welfare or development 
organization, but has moreover been controlling all their running projects and monitoring their 
foreign funding (Abdelrahman 2004).  
The NCW was established in 2000 and their role has been to inform the government of 
the impact of their policies on women and children (Sakr 2004). The council has also been 
working as an umbrella organization for other women’s NGO and a channel for large amount 
of funding. What seems like the main impact of the council is its power to dictate much of 
women’s rights projects and determine when and in what issues the women’s rights groups 
can partake. At the UN conference, Beijing +5, in 2000, the Egyptian delegation involved 
state-sponsored representatives and the former first lady held a speech in favor of micro-
credits and female entrepreneurs (Zuhur 2001). In 2004 during the preparation for a new 
reform in the PSL, several women’s rights organization stated that they were excluded from 
the debates before the law was enforced. The only actor in contact with legislators and 
ministries was the NCW and the women’s NGOs did not have a chance to give their 
reflections or opinion about the reform (Al-Sharmani 2009).   
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NCW can be argued to have been established to meet the high presence of women’s 
NGOs in Egypt. While being able to easily control these activities through its political and 
economical advantage it has also represented itself as a protector of Egyptian women’s 
interest. The statement of Nawal el-Saadawi in several interviews after January 25th 
Revolution, that Suzanne Mubarak killed the feminist movement in Egypt with the 
establishment of NCW is worth notice. 
Post-Revolution 
Even though it is still too early to conjecture how the revolution will impact gender justice 
and women’s activism in Egypt, there is a big transformation in conditions for the women’s 
NGOs and their participants. The members at CEWLA all showed a positive attitude towards 
the situation, even though the reports and media argue that women, once again, seem 
forgotten in the aftermath of the 18 days in the square of Tahrir, which overthrew the former 
president. The center’s priority of advocating for political participation was expressed by all 
members at the center. Projects that were established during my conducted fieldwork mainly 
focused on political participation among ordinary people and to raise awareness about the 
constitution referendum and the implications of voting “yes”, or “no”.  
Sehaam Ali, a lawyer in the advocacy program, who is normally lobbying and 
advocating for legal reforms and providing citizens with legal assistance, has shifted focus 
towards political awareness and participation. As she noted in the conversation with me: “The 
situation and people are not stable now, so I cannot sit here and apply family laws, I must go 
with the situation and focus on what is important” (Interview with Sehaam Ali, March 2011). 
This corresponds to what the director of CEWLA, Azza Suleiman, stated in an interview to 
the Weekly Al-Ahram state-run newspaper about the situation regarding women’s rights work 
67 
 
during this critical situation. She believes the transformation to a properly civil country is the 
main thing to focus on, not just women’s rights3.  
The organization has had earlier projects about political awareness and democracy in 
which youth between 20-30 years old were educated and spread this awareness among other 
citizens in their communities of Boulaq and Ard el-Lewaa. These projects have resumed 
together with seminars and workshops in coordination with other NGOs. At the same time, 
another member told me, they have to be careful so that the situation does not get dominated 
by a specific group such as the Muslim Brotherhood. She says it is very important that a 
variety of voices and ideas for the future are heard in the public debates and CEWLA has a 
significant role here.  
The overarching impression in the midst of reframed projects and thoughts about the 
future is the explicit sense of victory. This victory of not having the secret police harassing 
them and their projects, the victory of knowing that their vote will be counted, and the victory 
of freedom of expression.  
This chapter has presented CEWLA’s infrastructure, objectives, and the members 
interviewed for this thesis. It has further situated the organization within the Egyptian NGO 
scene with focus on various women’s NGOs’ relationship with international donors and the 
Egyptian state. CEWLA’s organized engagement with al-Azhar makes it a unique actor 
within Egyptian civil society and an interesting resource for the objective of this thesis. The 
chapter has finally explored the organization’s broader network of international organization 
                                                 
3
 Weekly Al-Ahram 21-27 April 2011, Issue No. 1044. Accessed July 26 2011 at: 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1044/fe1.htm 
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and donors, which has opened up for a discussion about the political and economical 
processes that penetrates global civil society. The chapter argues that even though CEWLA 
has space to choose from whom to receive funding, this choice is conditioned by the power 
structures of liberal political economy and the current dominant language within women’s 
rights work.  
Following chapter moves on to debated realms of women’s rights, Islamic legal thought, 
and transnational feminism. It explores the contemporary debates over the employment of 
Islam in women’s rights work. In relation to these debates, the chapter analyzes the 
organization’s members’ experiences of employing religion in their activities and perceptions 
of the relationships between Islamic discourse and women’s rights work.  
IV. WHO SAID WE HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN ISLAM AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 
The aim of this chapter is to explore and discuss the debates regarding the relationship 
between Islam, human rights, and gender justice in relation to how CEWLA interlocutors 
navigate these discourses. Inspired by the international human rights, CEWLA adopted this 
primary framework on which to base the objectives. The human rights framework is also used 
to guide and delineate the organization’s projects. Simultaneously, the organization employs 
various degrees of Islamic discourse throughout its work, and for discrepant reasons. 
However, for the members of CEWLA, the combination of human rights and Islamic 
discourse is not contradictory or problematic since they believe Islam, given “proper” 
interpretation, corresponds to the principles of human rights.  
The first part of this chapter maps out the contested realm of international human rights 
and raises some of the critiques towards its implications. The chapter also discusses more 
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explicit dialogues between Islamic legal tradition, Shari’a, and human rights. It continues with 
interviews with CEWLA members regarding their deployment of religion in the particular 
political and social context of Egypt. My material seeks to show CELWA’s deployment of 
religious discourse in encountering the former regime and hegemonic religious discourses. 
Additionally, religion is referred when advocating for reforms in PSL, and negotiating 
popular sensibilities. CEWLA’s multifaceted way of using religion is both connected to the 
growing international interest for Muslim politics, which in the NGO world has manifested 
through the highlighting of Muslim women’s identity, and demands from the Egyptian society 
in which religiosity has gained legitimacy (Abu-Lughod 2010).  
Critiquing Human Rights 
Articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights 
have developed into the hegemonic and normative language used in discussions concerned 
with social justice and equality. Framed in western dominated spaces and questioned over its 
cultural and political legitimacy, the realm of international human right is a controversial site 
for all involved actors. Critics explore the power dimensions of these realms and its origin in 
western political thought. Believing human rights are more of a problem than a solution, 
David Kennedy (2002) highlights the particular place and time in which the human rights 
discourse derived: the pre-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, western, modern, capitalist 
space. He argues that with pragmatic thinking, this origin is not necessarily negative as long 
as it does not neglect alternative emancipatory objectives than the ones defined within the 
nineteenth- and twentieth century western political tradition, which unfortunately has been the 
case. Kennedy stresses that the hegemony of human rights discourse has resulted in a 
domination of the imaginative spaces of emancipation, which makes other valuable 
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emancipatory strategies less available. The loss is local and diverse experiences and 
conceptualization of emancipation.  
Dianne Otto (1997) argues that it is precisely the marginalized voices that should 
rethink the universal discourse on human rights, especially in regards the notion of universal 
and cultural differences, or cultural relativism. She argues that post-structural thinking of 
feminist, post-colonial, queer, and subaltern scholarships is necessary in framing a 
transformative project of human rights strategies. This in turn will elucidate the mechanisms 
of power within the modernity project it emerged from. In the same vein, Saba Mahmood 
(2003), in her correlation of feminism and emancipatory projects, questions the liberal 
feminist normative and hegemonic idea of what counts as emancipation for women. She gives 
examples of subaltern groups of women with a distinct notion of emancipation and urges for a 
nuanced and historical understanding of women’s experiences and desires in life.   
The western world’s precedence over conceptual definitions like emancipation, justice, 
and rights has also resulted in vast human rights violations in US-led projects that aim to 
reinstate democracy or women’s rights (read Muslim women’s rights) in various locations. 
Otto (1997) explains how the universal and liberal discourse of human rights has set up new 
political agendas that have very little to do with human rights since these are actually used to 
violate human rights. Instead they are actually used to violate human rights attacking non-
European traditions, such as those found in Islam. These violation have continued and 
escalated. Today we can witness systematic violation of  human rights carried out by western 
states against a defined enemy, as demonstrated in the “war on terrorism”.  
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Islamic Legal Thought and Human Rights in Synergy 
Whereas these debates speak of the potentially problematic relationship of human rights and 
Islam they simultaneously create a vision of the necessity of projects in which these 
discourses are in conversation with each other.  A variety of Islamic thinkers, such as 
Sudanese Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Egyptian Tariq al-Bashiri, and Abdolkarim Soroush 
from Iran have tried to unify Islamic thinking and doctrines with human rights. However, 
there are also more pessimistic voices who claim that the two contradict. A literalist 
interpretation of Quran and Hadith perceives that the sacred texts as immutable and static over 
time and space. Emphasizing these timeless junctions of Islamic texts can create a challenge 
in applying these to a society subject to transformation and change (Akbarzadeh and 
Macqueen 2008). With Asad’s (1993) understanding of religion as a discursive tradition such 
interpretation is problematic. However, it must be understood within historic junctures of 
dominant knowledge discourses of Islamic legal history. A hegemonic feature of Islamic legal 
history is the “closure of Ijtihad”, which is a phrase used to sum up the history since the tenth 
century (Hallaq 2007). Ijtihad is the human effort in reaching legal opinion to the extent that 
the faculties of the scholars are incapable of continuing efforts in discovering God’s law. The 
closure of Ijtihad was equal to obeying God’s law without questioning the reasons behind it. 
This picture of Islamic law as incapable of change was adapted by both nationalists and 
Islamic traditionalists during colonial periods. It was also used by the colonial power in their 
claim that Islamic law had lost touch with its surrounding reality (Hallaq 2007). However, 
Hallaq (1987) contests this closure as a myth and shows in his chronological study that 
Ijtihad, despite controversies and debates, continues throughout Islamic legal history.  
To understand Islamic law as dynamic, changing, and subject to human reasoning is a 
condition for pursuing conversation between Islamic legal thought and human rights. While 
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An-Na’im (1990) recognizes the universality of human rights, he stresses that an engagement 
of religion and the recognition of religion as relevant and significant is indispensible for 
human rights advocates and scholars. Instead of perceiving human rights and Islam as a 
dichotomy, he views them as interdependent and in synergy. In his later writings, An-Na’im 
(2005, 2008) also includes secularism in this synergy. On one hand, he argues that if human 
rights are ever to be adopted as universal in religious societies, believers of these societies 
must perceive these rights as consistent with their religious convictions. On the other hand, 
that the protection of human rights are crucial for the integrity of religious belief and its 
relevance to its adherents. Consequently, each of them is dependent on the other in order to 
successfully being recognized.  
An-Na’im (1987) claims that the moral philosophical base and political justification of 
human rights can be found in Islamic traditions, however, to fully unify Islam with human 
rights will require theological reinterpretations. He emphasizes that it is the political, 
economical and social context in which these interpretations are taking place that are of major 
significance for the outcome and its potential of corresponding to human rights principles. 
Asef Bayat (2007) argues akin to An-Na’im that the question of whether or not Islam is 
compatible with democracy4 is wrongly put since the more relevant question to explore is 
under which circumstances this can be reality. Hence, the two authors recognize that it is the 
political and social context that shapes the theological traditions of Islam and nothing intrinsic 
in Islam makes it inherently incompatible with human rights or democracy.  
                                                 
4
 Bayat recognizes the ambiguity of “democracy” and refers to Marxist, feminist, and liberal political 
thought and their varying stances of what indicates democracy and how to define the term.  
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For Saba Mahmood (2003), An Na’im’s liberal embracing of human rights is 
problematic. She troubles recent scholarship of Muslim intellectuals that use liberal ideals of 
human rights and democracy as the norm to which Islamic legal thinking must prove its 
compatibility. The premise on which the conceptualization of democracy, human rights, and 
justice is based is rarely questioned, but used in the normative sense of liberal political 
thought. She stresses that the liberalism of the state is the ideal for many Muslim scholars, 
which mirrors the disparity in power between Anglo-European countries and Muslim 
societies. The liberal secular state as the best arrangement for all human societies needs to be 
put into question. It is probably that Mahmoud would like to see An-Na’im reverse his 
analysis and use Islamic doctrines and traditions to question the human rights discourse. This 
would open up debate of the issues international human rights discourse embody and explore 
how it can improve without the liberal political thought as the norm. An-Na’im is not doing 
that, nevertheless, he moves away from a normative understanding of secularism and 
recognizes that there is no universal definition of the concept. Each country’s experience of 
secularism is rather deeply contextual and culturally rooted and cannot simply be imported 
(2008). He therefore corresponds to Mahmood (2005) in her understanding of different 
models of secular states of which the Egyptian state is one. Instead of importing a notion of 
secularism, An-Na'im (2008; 138) stresses the necessity of internal validity and cultural 
legitimacy and urges scholars to focus on the "internal dynamics and processes to establish 
and consolidate constitutionalism, human rights, and citizenship within Islamic societies on 
their own terms" (138). However, An-Na’im’s nuanced understanding of secularism and the 
process of consolidating human rights would benefit from deeper analysis of the power 
dimensions at play both within societies and, as Mahmoud points out, between the west and 
Muslim societies.  
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I argue that CEWLA’s understanding of the relationship between religion and human 
rights coincides with Al-Na’im’s reading of the problem space. Assertions that Egypt is a 
religious society in which people are connected to religious life is a returning statement 
throughout the interviews and is one of the arguments for employing religious discourse 
within projects. Further, the members of CEWLA claim that Islam reinterpretated is not an 
impediment for women’s rights as declared in international human rights conventions. One of 
CEWLA’s tasks is to prove this compatibility. As earlier explored, the participants’ 
experiences reveal that dealing with (mis)interpretation of religion is a main part of their 
work. CEWLA members stress that the Egyptian society suffers from both the hegemonic 
religious discourse provided by the state and other actors along with confusions about 
religious verdicts. In the same manner as an-Na’im, my interviewees argue that since Islam is 
not a static entity with only one interpretation, this confusion and misinterpretation can 
change, which would support the cause of women’s rights. An-Na’im further explains that 
human rights must be viewed as consistent with the beliefs in Muslim communities, which in 
CEWLA’s work partly has manifested itself through their publication of the compatibility 
between CEDAW and Shari’a.  
State Religious Hegemony and Counter Hegemony  
What is CEWLA’s strategy to contend hegemonic state discourse of the Islamic? Many of my 
interviewees believe that the state is maintaining a false “Islam” that is used in order to 
underpin its interests. For CEWLA members, the Egyptian state has been the primary 
impediment for the implementation of gender justice, equality, and human rights. It is due to 
the state’s favor of a certain group in society and the marginalization of many others, 
CEWLA must cover up for its politics. This accurately corresponds to liberal political 
thoughts that civil society should be responsible for delivering welfare to citizens since the 
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state fails to do so. Through my interviewees it is revealed that the means, which the former 
Egyptian government utilized in order to maintain the public picture of the state as protector 
of the Egyptian people’s interests and strengthening its power are vast. An explicit tactic 
mentioned among CEWLA members is the particular religious discourse produced by the 
state through the institution of Al-Azhar.  
The 1970s revival of Islamic belief, also known as the Islamic awakening, was not just 
manifested through state oriented political groups, but as a religious sensibility in Muslim 
societies (Mahmoud 2005). In Egypt as a response to this, the Egyptian state energetically 
tried to represent itself as a religious, legitimate government with the accurate interpretation 
of Islam (Azzam 1996;  Barraclough 1998). Supporting such an image has been trough the 
transfer of administrative duties to the religious institution of al-Azhar, which consequently 
gained power within public debates and policy making. The regime has used the religious 
authorities in myriad of matters, mainly in the violent struggle against the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the more militant groups of Al-Jama’a Al-Islamiyyah and Al-Jihad, as well 
as matters regarding national legislation and policy making (Abdelrahman 2004). The former 
Mubarak regime used fatwas from al-Azhar to bolster its politics and to push its agenda 
forward. This has resulted in the partial success to maintain a particular Islamic discourse. 
Especially since the pro-government Shaykh Mohamed Sayyid Tantawi entered the directory 
of Al-Azhar in 1996 after the death of the more conservative and state critical Jad al-Haqq. 
The state has then through various venues broadcast a particular interpretation of Islam. The 
state media has been widely used for this purpose as well as the weekly lectures in the 
mosques. Also state-controlled, the mosques highlighted and discussed topics that were 
monitored and approved by the former government. 
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However, the religious discourse is one of many features through which the former 
regime exercised its hegemony. I have earlier referred to the former Egyptian state as a 
combination of patriarchal and nationalist ideology that has represented itself as the only actor 
able to respond to the interest of the Egyptian nation. Furthermore, the utilized various 
hegemonic discourses are not static or stable in any sense, but constantly negotiated and 
contested both by internal and external forces. Hegemonic discourses of Egypt’s former 
regime have hence not operated impervious to transnational forces. Since discourses of human 
rights and women’s rights have gained global terrain, the former regime was required to 
negotiate these new ideologies. Women’s rights discourse also fueled the rapidly increase in 
established women’s NGOs in Egypt and an internal contested realm developed within civil 
society. An indicator that the regime responded to the transnational appeal for women’s rights 
and civil society is Egyptian state feminism manifested mainly through the earlier discussed 
NWC. NWC’s, established in 2000, role was to inform the government of the impact of its 
policies on women and children. The government and state officials started to incorporate 
terms like women’s empowerment and women’s rights. Additionally, it also created a myriad 
of development programs that addressed women and their lives. The governmentalization of 
women’s questions during the last two decades, and the state media’s intensive reports 
regarding the success of NWC, resulted in that Egyptian state feminism became the dominant 
actor in delineating gender politics. Once again, this reinforced the idea that the government is 
the perfect protector of the nation. Simultaneously, its activity could be framed in a way so 
that it remained in control over the discourse of women’s rights. As Pratt (2005) argues, state 
feminism in Egypt inserted the concept of empowerment and women’s rights in a way that 
coexisted with the regime’s discourses and as not to challenge its hegemony.  
77 
 
In other words, the former regime has exercised power and maintained its hegemonic 
discourses through several different strands. These various elements are not completely 
autonomous, but mutually constitutive. This means that if there is a change in one of the 
elements, other elements change too (Pratt 2005).  As described, these elements are further 
realms in which power is continuously countered and negotiated. In turn, they have also 
resulted in new developed ways in which the government has tried to reinforce its hegemony. 
Hence, hegemonic religious discourse as addressed during my interviewees is present in this 
complex space, in which the former regime exercised power. Al-Azhar is one of many 
institutions, where religious hegemony has been reinforced and spread among people. 
However, it is effected and negotiated by surrounding elements of power.    
In terms of religious hegemonic discourse, Egypt is not alone facing the phenomenon of 
an Islamic awakening. In many Muslim societies, the government tried to transform certain 
politics as a strategy to contend revivalists.  It is not rare that women are at the center of this 
struggle. Aiwha Ong (1990) referred to the same situation in Malaysia where the secular state 
competed with the Islamic revival by launching its own Islamic campaign. The battle ground 
centered around women’s bodies and moral agency. It resulted in the state’s development of a 
new “family politics”, which was broadcast through various media and state controlled 
institutions. The struggle between the hegemonic discourse of the capitalist state and the 
counter hegemonic discourse of the Islamic umma intensified gender inequalities in Malay 
societies as both argued for the domestication of the Malay women and as the reproduces of 
racial stock.  
In Egypt, women’s lives have been at the center of several controversies between the 
state and revivalist Islamic discourse. The government has partly responded in a countering 
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manner. For instance, the government issued a statement that female genital cutting is a non-
Islamic practice while a leading Muslim Brotherhood scholar, Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi, 
has remained neutral. Another controversial action was the banning of the full face covering 
veil in Egyptian universities. However, the Islamic revival has also elicited a form of “show” 
in religiosity from the state, most notably in conservative segments of the family law (Badran 
1990).  
For CEWLA, challenging many elements of religious discourse produced by the former 
government has been significant in the struggle to achieve the association’s objectives. Large 
numbers of people are attending Friday prayers, watching the state media, and in other ways 
being subjected to the rhetoric and fatwas from al-Azhar. CEWLA wants to understand and 
monitor these state discourses that people are subjected to and to provide the citizens with an 
alternative understanding of Islam.  
Sherif, CEWLA’s Development Director, believes that many of the imams from al-
Azhar produce a false Islam. For these imams, it is not about religion: it is about pushing the 
regime’s politics forward. These imams have also been used by the government to justify 
atrocities against human rights, as well as creating a division between Muslims and Christians 
within the country. He believes these tactics were revealed during the January 25th Revolution 
when Muslims and Christians fought together side by side, proving that people can think for 
themselves. “The regime always said people are too stupid to think for themselves, but they 
can, and they showed that in the revolution” (Sherif. Interview conducted on February, 2011).  
The strategies CELWA employs in challenging the dominating discourse are numerous. 
One such tactic is to collaborate with progressive religious scholars, imams, and authorities, 
in order to reveal that there are other interpretations of Islam. Many of these religious 
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authorities come from Al-Azhar, which indicates the varying characteristics of individuals 
within the institution. Al-Azhar is a large organization, which does not represent a 
homogenous voice. Like members of any institution, authorities, scholars and imams from al-
Azhar do not assemble a homogenous group of people. Instead, they take various positions 
against the former regime and espouse different gender ideologies. Several of my 
interviewees informed me that CEWLA tries to find the most progressive scholars within Al-
Azar and then establish a strong communicative relationship. 
Another strategy has been to interact directly with the former regime, in attempts to 
encourage the regime to raise important topics through its control of al-Azhar and the 
mosques. Noura, one of CEWLA’s lawyers,  describes how CEWLA first uses a religious 
authority, such as a professor in Islamic law or a progressive imam, to clarify if a certain 
behavior or practice in society is religiously permissible or not, haram or halal. Afterwards, 
they set up round table discussions with people from Awqaf, the ministry controlling the 
mosques, to discuss the particular topic. CEWLA provides Awqaf representatives with reports 
with detailed knowledge regarding various issues. This gathered information is based on 
research conducted at different communities, in order to make Awqaf representatives 
acknowledge the possible harm on the society and people. According to Noura, “We are 
educating people from Awqaf about the situation within the community and the problems that 
the citizens are facing”(Interview with Noura conducted on February 2011). CEWLA’s goal 
is to make the authorities from the government address the issues with imams so it can be 
discussed and resolved in the Friday prayer.  
It is not a straight forward to route for CEWLA when the organization operates in the 
realm of civil society and counters the state’s hegemonic religious discourse. While they 
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critique segments of religious voices from Al-Azhar, they also work together with individuals 
from the institution of Al-Azhar in order to pursue their objectives. For instance, this can be 
seen in the case of the controversial khul’ reform in 2000. Khul’ is a women’s legal right to 
file for divorce and the reform created vast tensions between legislators, religious authorities, 
civil society, and public opinion. However, the state supported this reform and together with 
the Grand Imam Tantawi, the Egyptian state implemented the legal reform that corresponds to 
CEWLA’s demands. In a report compiled by  CEWLA, Director Azza Suleiman (2005) states 
that CEWLA recognizes that khul’ alone will not guarantee justice for women as long as there 
are no radical changes in the procedural rules and legislative system governing personal 
issues. The report means that, in the end, it is the dialectical relationship between the law, 
legal bodies, and individuals that implement the law reform that has the potential to work in 
favor for women. Based on a field study over the numbers of khul' petitions filed and the 
percentage of khul' judgments pronounced, the reports argues that the result shows that the 
filed petitions are minuscule since the ratification of the law. For these results and the general 
lack of public support for the khul’ reform, CEWLA partly blames the mass media for 
employing a cynical and superficial coverage of the new law, which undermined the possible 
popular support. CEWLA also acknowledges that certain members of the parliament who had 
an extreme negative attitude against the law, which was widely reported in the national press. 
These politicians failed to speaking in favour for the law. Consequently, their silence 
extensively contributed to the lack of public support.  
CEWLA is not alone for blaming the state and the media for limiting the legitimacy of 
khul’ in public opinion. In an interview with the head of NCWR, Nihad Abul-Qomsan (2011), 
she told state owned newspaper Al-Ahram: 
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If society hasn't been able to accept khul' more than 10 years after its inception, 
this means that government, education and the media have not played their 
proper role in showing that this right is important to society 
(http://weekly.ahram.org.eg). 
These perspectives are interesting, as it indirectly question of the former regime’s actual 
objective behind the reform. While the state promoted khul’ it was simultaneously 
discouraged the legitimacy of the law in public attitudes through the controlled press. This 
may strengthen the argument that the state mainly implemented the law because of 
international pressure, without any profound conviction to establish justice between spouses. 
In other words, even though amendments of the law promoted by the state can correspond to 
CEWLA’s proposed reforms, the state can have a rather different objective with the law. 
Ultimately, in producing a particular discourse, the state works against the very reform it has 
instituted. Even though CEWLA is not countering the state’s religious discourse as in the case 
of khul’, the organization works against the state’s attempt of portraying the reform as 
negative within the Egyptian society. Through published reports, seminars, and other public 
events, CEWLA’s task is to counter the public discourse that the state produces and 
maintains. This indicates that CEWLA is aware that law reform is not a guarantee that 
improvements are indeed made. Instead, the entire system requires more fundamental change. 
In one of my interviewees, Gawaahar, an employee of CEWLA’s advocacy program, explains 
that the deficits in the legal system reach beyond the implementation of the law. Even if the 
verdict actually is in favour for women, there is a small chance that the order will be executed. 
For example, sometime men prefer to go to prison for a short amount of time than pay 
alimony to his ex wife. According to Gawaahar, when an official is sent to ensure the 
execution of the verdict, he is bribed, ensuring that the case is not reviewed or further 
examined. Besides the huge issues of corruption these narratives tell, feminist criticism of the 
state have questioned the effectiveness of focusing on law reforms when the institution, which 
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will administer the law, is tied to prerogatives of manhood within a male-dominated society 
(Brown 1992). Women are not solely legal subjects, but also situated within, and effected by, 
the liberal political economy (Abu-Lughod 2009), which, in turn, is the main preserver of 
atrocities against women Mohanty (2003).  
Although CEWLA views the state as the primary barrier for women’s rights, the former 
regime’s hegemonic discourse is far from operating alone on the realm of civil society. As 
mentioned previously, the former state’s attempt to represent itself as a religious government 
was a response to the public rising support for the Islamic revival. The Muslim Brotherhood 
has been a strong force within the Islamic awakening and the groups has been argued to 
represent the dominant counter religious discourse in contemporary Egypt (Bayat 2007; 
Abdelrahman 2004). During my interviews at CEWLA, the Muslim Brotherhood’s religious 
discourse is addressed twice. Seham, who works mainly on developing proposals for law 
reforms, explained that she hesitates in trusting the Muslim Brotherhood because of its 
heterogeneous character. She further explained that there are fractions within the 
Brotherhoods that stretch from progressive positions to more conservative stances on 
women’s rights. She shows concern over how she will know who will take power over the 
women’s question if they gain power. Nonetheless, Noura talks about the Brotherhood in 
positive terms. She believes they have a progressive interpretation of Shari’a and they are also 
known for showing interest in the Egyptian’s desires and needs. Beside the Muslim 
Brotherhood, there are several other religious groups in Egypt with adherent gender ideology. 
After January 25th Revolution there has been apparent concerns in public media and debates 
over the gained public space of conservative religious strands in the Egyptian society. 
However, this concern is not present during the interviews and these groups are not 
mentioned. 
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The relationship with the state is clearly a complex feature in CEWLA’s work. As 
Gramsci (1971) describes, there is no clear division between the state and the civil society, as 
the ruling machine operates on the realm of civil society through its various institutions. Al-
Azhar is one of these institutions, which with its intellectual, historical, and economical 
advantage, manifests a hegemonic discourse of Islam. On the one hand, this discourse has 
been appealing to Egyptian people as it suits large segments of the peoples’ every day, ideas 
of life, and activities. On the other hand, this discourse has been protecting the regime’s 
power. However, myriad of other actors, such as CEWLA, Islamic groups and organizations, 
other women’s groups, Christian and Coptic organizations, political parties, social 
movements, and state affiliated associations, are located on the same arena as Al-Azhar. 
These actors are either reproducing the discourse and ideas of thoughts of Al-Azhar, or 
challenging them. This strategy of directly interacting with the state, in order to influence the 
Islamic discourse corresponds to Gramsci’s (2001) definition of counter hegemony as a 
practice of reframing an already existing activity. In the same vein as the regime, CEWLA has 
used ideas of thoughts, intellectuals, and religious authorities in its activity of questioning and 
rework the discourse in play.  
Navigating the Implications of Shari’a as the Source to the Law 
CEWLA’s deployment of religion is not isolated to only challenging state-produced Islam, 
but penetrates the organization activities in its works with the grassroots and local 
communities. When questioning when and why religion is used, my interviewees explained 
that the usage of religion allows them to enter a space of strategy, logic, and religious 
interpretation. Religious discourse is also a significant feature regarding human rights and 
family legislation. The bulk and the most explicit deployment of religion is in the advocacy 
programs, which are mainly framing and lobbying for reforms in the PSL.  
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According to Seham, when developing and writing legal reform proposals, it must be 
initially clarified that these proposals do not contradict Shari’a. This is of high significance 
since article 25 in the constitution states that current law derives from the divine law. People 
will always ask her if the reform corresponds with Shari’a. To guarantee that her written 
proposals do not contradict with Shari’a, she normally seeks help from Al-Azhar University’s 
School of Shari’a Law, asking scholars to find her arguments that support her reform 
proposals. She also uses her own knowledge about Shari’a that she obtained from law school. 
Finally, she refers to her own library of articles about Shari’a and fiqh. She believes that the 
core part of her work is to ensure that the reforms correspond to the divine law. For her, this 
alignment is not only due to the constitution, but because both Muslims and Christians, are 
linked to their religious lives.  
Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution has created great tension for long time and 
escalated during the January 25th Revolution in relation to debates over the potential of 
transforming Egypt in to a civil state, dawlah medaniyah. Article 2 can be traced back to 1971 
when President Sadat responded to the Muslim Brotherhood’s demand by adding the 
previously absent clause of Shari’a as a source to the legislation. In 1981, President Mubarak 
reframed the article so it read that Shari’a is the source to legislation, which arguably also was 
to satisfy the Brotherhood. One argument for removing the clause is due to the Christian 
minority in Egypt. The Coptic writer and political observer Naji Youssef (2009) argues6 that 
when a legal subject stands in front of the court and judge, there should be no difference in 
treatment according to religion. He also asks which of the various interpretations of Shari’a is 
                                                 
5
 Article 2 in the Egyptian constitution: Islam is the religion of the state, and the Arabic language is its official language. 
The principles of Islamic law are the chief source of legislation.  
6
 http://islamexplained.com/UVG/UVG_video_player/TabId/89/VideoId/678/204-----.aspx 
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to be the legislation’s source. When addressing these debates and asking for Seham’s 
perspective on the second article, she stated that there is a lot of confusion about this article, 
which makes people focus too much on it. She believes that, because the majority of the 
population in Egypt is Muslim, there is no problem that the article states that Islam is the 
religion. In terms of the article’s statement that Shari’a is the source to law, Seham clarified 
that the article states that the principles of Shari’a should be the source to legislation and not 
doctrines from Shari’a. Seham emphasized that it must be clear to people that there is a 
difference between principles and doctrines. According to her, the principles of Shari’a are 
values such as equality, justice, freedom of religion, and so on. Certain doctrines of Shari’a 
can obviously not be applied on Christians, but that is not what the article implies. She also 
stated that CEWLA does not discuss this article as they do not see a particular issue with it. 
Seham is aware of that some Christians fear that this article can allow the state to enforce 
Shari’a laws upon them. Nonetheless, to Seham this is irrational. She believes this article is 
focused upon because some people wish to create a split between Muslims and Christians in 
the country.   
Regarding legal reforms that are valid for both Muslims and Christians, Seham 
explained that CEWLA tries to reform legal articles that are applicable to both Muslims and 
Christians, without contradicting any of the divine laws, and then make a common law for 
both religions. The commonalities are on areas such as age for custody, alimony, and age of 
marriage. According to her, the divorce law is more controversial since Islam and Christian 
law differs in this matter and because the various strands within Christianity take different 
stances on divorce. Seham stresses they need to found the mutual laws and unify them under a 
common law, but then allow for the differences and respect these.  
86 
 
An Na’im (1987) addresses the rights of minorities under Shari’a with reference to the 
international human rights. He states that discriminations against religious minorities, or non-
religious citizens, can never be justified by Islamic cultural relativism as no state possesses 
the right to treat minorities however it wishes. However, he argues that the rights of minorities 
should not be a problem for Islamic modern clerics to ensure since minorities’ rights are 
nothing that inherently goes against the Shari’a. He believes that Islam rather emphasizesthe 
rights of minorities and refers to the tradition of interpretation of Islamic sources and the 
Muslim reformers who cite Quranic verses from the Meccan period. These sources and 
religious scholars support complete freedom of choice and prohibit any coercion on non-
Muslims. To avoid any cultural relativism in formulating minority rights, An Na’im believes 
the international human rights must be the guiding principle for such reforms. Article 40 in 
the Egyptian constitution reads that all citizens are equal before the law. They have equal 
public rights and duties without discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, 
language, religion, or creed.    
Seham’s position on article 2 would be regarded by many as a sign that she does not 
advocate for a “secular” PSL. This article of the constitution has been the primary linchpin 
over the debates regarding a non-civil law and the main impediment towards a transformation 
to a complete dawlah medaniyah. Seham’s position is not the only stance among members of 
CEWLA, which reveals the contradictions and limitations of attributing women’s rights work 
as either “secular” or “religious” based.  
Gawaahar’s story contradicts Seham’s, Gawaahar also works within the advocacy 
program, but focuses on projects concerning legal training, human rights awareness, and 
communication skills among lawyers and mediators. She argues against article 2 because it is 
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not fair to the Christian minority to base the law on Shari’a. She claims that CEWLA 
advocates for a secular civil law and that the organization is not very interested in Shari’a. 
However, she explained that CEWLA is using religious scholars and authorities when 
proposing reforms, but because the prevailing legislation is based on Shari’a. For instance, in 
a proposed reform regarding the division of wealth after a divorce, CEWLA received help 
from Abdle Moty Bayoumy, a professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Al-Azhar University and 
member of the Islamic Research Academy. She continues: “Just because we are using a 
religious language when advocating for reforms, it does not mean we want an Islamic 
country”. Regarding the laws of Christians and Muslim, she argues CEWLA wants a 
complete common civil law for both religions. This is especially desired in issues such as 
divorce as Christian law only accepts divorce due to adultery.  
In searching for supplemental information regarding the organizations position on 
article 2, no direct official statement on this matter was found. However, Noha, who is 
responsible for the international relations and donors, informed me that CEWLA does not 
have a public announcement towards the referendum of the constitution that in March 19, 
2011. She explained that their focus is on political awareness and participation. In fact 
CEWLA staff voted both “yes” and “no” to the constitution. From other informal discussions 
with members at CEWLA, I obtained the information that they want to change extensive parts 
of the current constitution. Nonetheless, article 2 was not named in these conversations. 
Talking to Seham, I mentioned that other staff members had used the argument of a Christian 
minority against the second article. She responded that people are not knowledgeable about its 
implications. People mix up the principles of Shari’a with doctrines of Shari’a.  
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The different positions of Seham and Gawaahar can be due to a myriad of reasons. Even 
though they both work within the advocacy program, they perform rather distinct tasks within 
the field of law and draw on different frameworks. Seham is working on reforms in PSL, 
which entail a daily interaction with Shari’a and religious interpretation. Gawaahar is 
educating and training mediators in human rights conventions and values. Hence, their 
everyday work, individual convictions, and scales of personal engagement with their 
profession can hence be conflated with the official profile of CEWLA. Because CEWLA’s 
work is constantly fluidly using various frameworks, Seham and Gawaahar different positions 
are necessarily neither rights or wrong. It can also indicate various definitions of dawlah 
medaniyah. The popular Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi is tied to the Muslim Brotherhood and 
controversial in the US for supporting violence against Israel and US soldiers in Iraq. He held 
his first speech in 50 years in middle of February 2011 at Tahrir square where he called for 
dawlah medaniyah. Even though they both use the term dawlah medaniyah, al-Qaradawi and 
the Coptic writer Naji Youssef are most likely not advocating for the same model of a civil 
state. However, the term is used by both in order to outline a vision of the future Egypt. A 
distinction in definitions of concepts among members of CEWLA is not impossible. The 
different positions of Seham and Gawaahar certainly indicates how critical definitions are, 
especially related to “secular” and “religious” ideas of the state, legislation, and gender 
politics.   
CEWLA engages with religious discourse in terms of both Muslims and Christians. The 
CEWLA staff uses stories from the Bible when interacting with Christians in the same vein as 
the Quran. When Seham works on reforms in the Christian family law, she goes back to the 
time when Christians could file divorce on nine conditions, as opposed to current law, which 
89 
 
only allows divorce due to adultery. All members of CEWLA I talked to are keen to clarify 
that they work both for the Muslim and Christian community.  
Egyptian Personal Status Law and Human Right Conventions  
Beside female Muslim academics and activists, other scholars have also explored the ways in 
which the contemporary PSL developed in Muslim societies. The historic trajectories of the 
family law are significant in any analysis, debate, or reform advocacy of the law. The 
historicity of family legislation reveals that articles in the current PSL are not based purely on 
human interpretations of Shari’a. During the colonial rule in Egypt and the formation of the 
secular nation state, the country went through extensive transformation in legal administration 
and practice. Sonbol (2007) and others (Tucker 2007, Hallaq 2009) explain that there was a 
great contextual complexity open for interpretation in the pre-modern legal practice, and these 
practices changed as part of the historical process. Records from the Ottoman rule also reveal 
the large presence of women as litigants, filing cases such as divorce, alimony, and 
inheritance, which rapidly decreased with the formation of the state. Shari’a courts had often 
judicial power in urban areas, the rural areas followed customary procedures and a third kind 
of courts administrated non-Muslims’ cases. With European presence, the Shari’a courts were 
gradually replaced by Mixed Courts for the non-natives that were controlled by the state. Over 
time, Shari’a law was confined to only administering family law and religious endowments 
and essentially structured to define the Egyptian Personal Law (Asad 2001). Asad means that 
when the divine law is placed in a subdivision of law, which is determined by the centralizing 
state, it is hence secularized in distinctive ways. The emerging secular state, nationalist 
ideology, and capitalist mode of production created a demarcation of private and public realm 
and the (nuclear) family was defined. Additionally, courts improved, juridical staff were 
educated, and the sacred text was codified to take care of what was defined as private matter. 
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It is in this process, Asad (2001) argues, where we find reforms that eventually translate the 
Shari’a to PSL, which is clearly a process of secularization. 
As described, the current Egyptian legislation regulates family matters cannot only be 
traced back to Islamic traditions and indigenous changes: it is a narrative of how Shari’a 
became part of a process in which society should adopt the formation of a state apparatus. A 
state based on principles of liberalism, capitalism, individualism, and secularism. From my 
interviewees and the analysis of CEWLA’s published materials, the historical trajectories of 
PSL are well recognized by CEWLA and utilized as arguments when approaching the PSL. It 
is also clear that they employ methods provided by “Islamic feminists”, especially in clear 
marked distinction between Shari’a and fiqh. The networking group NWRO, which CEWLA 
is part of, has published an extensive report addressing many shortcomings in the PSL. This 
guide was given to me by a member of CEWLA. It includes recommendations and guidelines 
for an amending personal law that meets the principles of the Egyptian constitution, which 
guarantees protection of motherhood and childhood, and the international instruments ratified 
by the Egyptian government. Throughout the guide, the recommendations are remained 
aligned to the principles of Shari’a and drawing from the “enlightened interpretations”. It 
emphasizes that Shari’a is applicable to all places and all times. Therefore, it should be 
interpreted with regards to the reality of current society and the changes it is going through. 
The introduction states that no opinion should overrule another, as Islam encourages 
argumentation and reasoning, and denies the upholding of one singular view. On this 
foundation, the family legislation must be discussed from various perspectives and should be 
based on the following principles: mutual responsibility, respect, understanding, and the 
assurance of family members’ rights to equality, justice, freedom, and rule of law. The 
report’s vision is to guide reform projects, so that the PSL will be “based on the principles of 
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citizenship and human rights, and inspired by the enlightened vision and right understanding 
of divine religions”.  
My interviewees believe that there are no inherent barriers within Islam towards a 
reform of PSL. Moreover, CEWLA members made no assumptions that there would be any 
contradictions in a law based upon the international human rights framework, while holding 
on to the principles of Shari’a. Some of the CEWLA members refer to the report published by 
CEWLA and the UN, in which Al-Azhar’s Islamic philosophy professor Dr. Amna Nosseir, 
concludes that 95% of Shari’a corresponds with CEDAW. Nosseir argues that CEDAW 
should be applied as long as it does not confront Shari’a. However, her research demonstrates 
that there are very few articles that should be rejected due to this reason. Although there are 
few contradictions, human rights and Shari’a must be understood as two separate frameworks 
that play different role within the legal reform advocacy. This is further clarified by Seham. If 
we compare Shari’a with CEDAW, we would find that Shari’a provides even more rights for 
women than CEDAW. However, CEDAW is less susceptible to misinterpretation than Shari’a 
Therefore, it is a good supplement. Seham views CEDAW as an effective tool to push the 
government to implement laws that creates equality between men and women. CEDAW is 
like a “knife to the neck” for the policy makers. If they do not obey, they will look very bad in 
the eyes of other countries. She carries on that it is not Shari’a, but the chaotic state of people 
and the society that makes it difficult to only rely on shair’a. Other participants view CEDAW 
more as the core foundation of the organization as it began as a collaborative project with 
UNICEF. It is also referred to as the most applicable framework for CEWLA’s work as it 
allows them to pursue their objectives of promoting and enabling rights for both the Muslim 
and Christian communities. For Gawaahar, who opposes against article 2, the human rights 
framework does not favor any religion more than another. 
92 
 
The NWRO’s legal guide refers to an “enlightened interpretation” of Islamic law. This 
interpretation corresponds to the interpretation done by the different religious authorities that 
CEWLA systematically engages with. These progressive scholars and imams often state that 
contemporary personal law contains gaps. These gaps are due to classical interpretations, 
which have negative effects on women’s rights and prohibit many rights women should be 
entitled to. These progressive religious scholars employ a contextual reading of the Islamic 
texts and use the contemporary reality as a reference, when pursuing interpretation according 
to the Islamic methodological rules. One of these progressive scholars is Dr. Abdel Moty 
Bayumi who is a member of the Islamic Studies Academy at al-Azhar University and a 
former Dean of the Faculty of Religious Sciences. CEWLA published Bayumi’s book On 
Women’s Issues addresses guardianship, superiority (Qiwama), polygamy, and women's 
testimony. When he puts fiqh into a historic and contextual analysis in order to critique earlier 
Islamic jurisprudence, he clearly employs methods of “Islamic feminism”. In terms of 
guardianship, which states that a husband has the obligation to maintain the wife and she will 
in turn obey him, Bayumi believes that the conditions on which guardianship are based upon 
are not applicable today, as women are just as likely as men to earn their money and provide 
for their families. Today, women are taking part in public life, science, and the work field. 
They earn money and hold positions that make them many times superior to men, which make 
the condition for guardianship absent. This way of reasoning is appealing to women’s NGOs 
today. As such, Dr. Bayumi is well quoted by several women’s organizations.  
Conclusions 
This chapter identifies mainly two features in CEWLA’s deployment of religion and 
engagement with religious authorities. The first feature of the chapter reveals that religious 
discourse partakes on a multidimensional level and is not just isolated to family legislation. 
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The internal political climate and complex conditions on civil society requires CEWLA to 
point to and address multiple sites, carried out with different methods. The former regime 
produced a hegemonic Islamic discourse, in order to display its religiosity and strengthen its 
power. This particular religious discourse is countered by CEWLA through the organization’s 
interaction with state institutions and representatives, not least with al-Azhar. Through 
approaching the state, CELWA creates a space of debates and conversations within which the 
organization critiques the prevailing discourse. Furthermore, CEWLA provides an alternative 
religious discourse that is often more anchored in people’s lived experiences, yet within the 
framework of religion. Additionally, CEWLA invites religious authorities and scholars to 
these debates, in order to encourage dialogue between various actors and demonstrate the 
many reading of Shari’a. Gramsci’s concept of counter hegemony as something that works 
with the existing activity helps to identify CEWLA’s own attempts of creating a counter 
hegemony. Through CEWLA’s various methods, the center questions, reframes, and comes 
up with alternative understandings of Islam. However, CEWLA is not trying to implement a 
completely new idea of religious sensibilities. On the one hand, the objective is to critique 
certain contents within the government’s religious discourse. On the other hand the objective 
is to counter the state’s efforts to create negative public opinion concerning various aspects of 
the family legislation and women’s rights.  
The second feature of CEWLA’s deployment of religion in this chapter is the strong 
conviction that there are no contradictions between CEDAW and Shari’a regarding women’s 
rights. The conclusion of the compatibility of CEDAW and Shari’a is made by progressive 
Islamic scholars who. Through contextualizing and historicize Islamic jurisprudence fiqh, 
these scholars critique earlier classical jurists and argue for a family legislation that better 
suits the conditions of the contemporary society and the issues women and men are facing. 
94 
 
This method is also implemented by “Islamic feminists” who urge for an understanding of the 
distinctions between Shari’a and fiqh. Drawing on An Na’im’s (1986) view on the synergy 
between human rights and Shari’a, CEWLA member perceive the two as separate, yet, 
complementary frameworks. CEDAW provides clear guidance for legal reforms and is a tool 
used to encourage the state to commit to human rights. Shari’a, with its potential of 
reinterpretation, is the contemporary source to legislation and meaningful to large segments of 
the population and their identities. In the debate concerning family legislation, CEWLA is one 
of many actors who have opened and facilitated a space where religious scholars and 
authorities, local activists, policy makers, and jurists can interact and discuss legal concept, 
religious interpretation, and the PSL in relation to gender politics. This does not just create a 
stronger female subject position within a predominant male domain it does also create a shift 
towards a more local understanding of how to negotiate gender inequalities in Egyptian 
legislation. Not least do they manifest an alternative Islamic discourse in society and among 
citizens. For example, the interpretation that khul’ is something granted to women by God is, 
promoted by CELWA, is a different understanding of shair’a than the one deriving from 
classical jurisprudence (Al-Sharmani 2011).  
Together these two features elucidates that CEWLA operates across boundaries of the 
“secular” and “religious”, a dichotomy that often is used in reference to women’s activism in 
Egypt. The ways in which NGOs are framing and performing their activity must be explored 
through a socio-political lens and put into the local conditional context. Additionally, 
women’s NGO work must be analyzed with an open eye towards the complexity of how 
secular and religious discourses travel within society, state, legislation, and public opinion.  
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The following chapter addresses the ways in which CEWLA engages with the 
grassroots and local communities. The chapter discusses how CEWLA is dealing with 
sensitive topics and how the center solves disputes outside of the state controlled legislation. 
Moreover, it discusses how religion also plays a significant role in projects on the grass root 
level, which sheds further light to the complexity of civil society, NGO work, and 
categorizations of women’s activism.     
V. NEGOTIATING DISCURSIVE SPACES AS A ROUTE TO SOCIAL 
CHANGE   
This final fieldwork chapter moves away from CEWLA’s relationship with the state and the 
formal legal system towards the organization’s work with the grassroots and local 
communities. The chapter explores what strategic mechanisms of negotiation are at play when 
CEWLA interacts with members of the public. I will discuss a few particular narratives, 
which I believe illustrate the complexity of CEWLA’s work. These narratives show how the 
members of the center navigate community discourse and effect transformation on the ground. 
The chapter argues that CEWLA is not in a position to single-handedly create revolutionary 
change to Egypt’s social system. However, by negotiating various and dynamic discursive 
processes within the community, CEWLA generates change in the social imagination of 
people. This change becomes tangible in the way people inhabit new subject positions in 
localized cases. 
How CEWLA engages with the community will be demonstrated by first exploring the 
various frameworks and languages that CEWLA employs when interacting with communities 
and its members. There are several factors that determine the ways in which CEWLA 
members chose to handle cases brought to them by individuals. Both the character of the issue 
and the individual’s personality are important factors. Additionally, CEWLA carefully 
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reflects over the individual’s particular circumstances and the context of the problem. These 
factors are also taken into consideration when the members of CEWLA discursively select the 
approaches for engaging with particular social issues. Every unique situation, and each person 
that comes to the organization for help, requires CEWLA to carefully judge what strategy will 
generate the best result. I outline this process through the concept of framing. Framing  is 
used in social movement theory when analyzing how movements make sense of common 
goals and objectives in order to mobilize people (Merry 2006).  
Much of CEWLA’s work takes place in Cairo’s informal areas and in the context of 
Egypt’s informal sector of employment, politics, and conflict resolution. When CEWLA 
operates on the ground, the organization often utilizes informal rather than official and legal 
ways of conflict negotiation. Singerman (2007) refers to this informal realm as the “familial 
ethos”, which is the legitimating discourse operating outside the state controlled realm. In 
order to pursue the organization’s objectives, CEWLA chooses time and again to make use of 
the informal legal system as a substitute for the limited state-regulated legal system in Egypt. 
However, the organization’s commitment to international human rights conventions and its 
ambition to move Egypt towards these conventions affect its work with the local 
communities. Since the organization’s activities are embedded in the discourses of familial 
ethos, they have the ability to reframe these discourses and challenge particular elements, 
which, according to the organization, are impediments to international human rights.  
Although CEWLA uses the informal sector in Egypt, the center’s extensive work 
towards amendment of Egyptian family legislation indicates its support of a state-controlled 
law system. A well functioning state-controlled legal system provides citizens with non-
arbitrary rule of law and guarantees that each and every person is equal before the law. 
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However, CEWLA has realized that current multiple and complex defects in the Egyptian 
legal system make it extremely limited in its potential to deliver the rights to which citizens 
are legitimated. Therefore, CEWLA invests much recourses towards the familial ethos in 
which an alternative normative ordering already is at play. In order to maintain equality 
outside of the state controlled legal system, CEWLA tries to incorporate familial ethos with 
the center’s principles of justice derived from the international human rights framework.  
I explore how CEWLA begun to debate private concerns as public matters by 
illustrating the social imaginations they engage with in local communities of Cairo. I further 
show how these imaginations create the condition under which CEWLA’s work operates. 
Social imaginations are key for CEWLA to understand such as the demarcation between 
private and public, religious practice, and other discourses that produce men’s and women’s 
gendered selves. By understanding these discourses, the center can further strive to reframe 
the social imaginations in order to realize the organization’s foundational goal. This chapter 
outlines the operational spaces that CEWLA has established in order to approach these 
discursive realms. These operational spaces are, among others, counseling service, legal 
advice, and projects supporting families through familial disputes. These projects are 
developed through intense relations with the community and its members. Close contact with 
the community has made it possible for the organization to identify societal deficits and 
formalize venues, through which CEWLA assists the community members on various levels 
in life.  
Mechanisms of Framing within the Informal Sector of Egypt 
In order to understand the organization’s work, one has to carefully balance how CEWLA 
approaches each case. While international human rights and CEDAW conventions are the 
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foundational road map and guiding principles, the organization has a broad repertoire of 
frameworks and languages it makes use of when engaging with different people in local 
communities.   
My interviewees explain that it is both the character of the issue and the person they 
have in front of them that guide their evaluation of the situation. The issue and the person also 
determine through what channels CEWLA staff best can meet in-person the individual 
seeking guidance. The members of CEWLA frequently refer to the various “languages” they 
use in order to establish a common ground with clients. However, it is also clear that some 
situations require evaluation from diverse perspective. In such situations, different 
frameworks often are entangled. In terms of female genital cutting for instance, CEWLA uses 
imams and doctors in order to address the practice both from a religious and medical 
perspective. The imam refers to the holy Quran and Hadith to confirm that it is not an Islamic 
doctrine and the doctor shows what physical harm the practice can cause young girls. 
CEWLA also uses interactive methods to reach the community. In the context of female 
genital cutting, the organization stages theatre plays in which women’s own experiences are 
highlighted. These plays further add a humanitarian aspect to the topic with underlying 
international human rights values, such as informed choice and body integrity. Female genital 
cutting is accordingly approached from various angels and knowledge drawn from different 
sources. This broadens the discourses around the topic.  
In other situations, members of CEWLA told me that they also use logical reasoning 
and psychological terminology, as well as religious arguments. Religion is often referenced 
when discussing situations within familial life in Egypt since it is well embedded in the 
martial discourse. In particular, it seems like a significant perspective in situations regarding 
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divorce, custody, and inheritance. Religion may also provide parental guidance and marriage 
advice. However, Noura, from the combating violence program, explained that CEWLA staff 
wants people to use sound reasoning. Instead of settling for commonly produced religious 
arguments and societal norms and sensibilities, CEWLA aims for people to reflect over 
situations and religious knowledge. Noura argues that CEWLA’s task is to open up this 
process among people in various ways. Islamic discourse is one way, but she believes that 
decision-making processes are often about values that go beyond religion. She believes that if 
a husband is a nice man who does not hit his wife or look at other women, he is a man with 
good values, not necessarily a religious man. Wisham, who is active in the counseling project 
and provides psychological services, explained that she uses religious language as a last 
alternative. She initially talks to people from a perspective of logic reasoning and psychology. 
If she fails to establish a common ground, she then uses religion. In such situations, she refers 
to religious stories and Hadith and uses knowledge obtained through religious law courses. 
However, sometimes when there is a difficult dispute, CEWLA needs to bring in a religious 
authority in order to solve the issue.  
How various languages in different situations take place may be conceptually explored 
through the concept of “framing”. Framing is a term social movement theory uses to explain 
the ways in which social movements mobilize activist around shared beliefs and collective 
actions. The “frame” is not an idea in itself, but works through the package and presentation 
of ideas. A condition for framing is that the frame should be resonant with local traditions and 
narratives in order to be appealing (Snow 2004). In the cases when CEWLA uses Islam, or 
Christianity, in their discursive approach, this packaging moves beyond its immediate use in 
social movements and becomes religious discourse channeled through various religious 
narratives, languages, and arguments.  
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However, to some extent, the members of CELWA still work within the same principle 
as social movements in terms of framing. The principles addressed by social movements that 
are located within the constraints of existing discursive fields whose complex and multivocal 
messages are open to various and uncontrollable interpretations. Human rights intermediaries, 
like the participants I have interviewed, put global human rights ideas into familiar symbolic 
terms and use stories of local indignities and violations to give life and power to global 
movements (Merry 2006b). The members at CEWLA are guided by the international human 
rights framework. However, as the Egyptian context is a complex web of multiple discourses, 
they frame their objective in order to meet the community on a common ground. This not to 
argue that the organization produces a form of cultural gesture in order to accommodate the 
popular sector, or that religion is used a strategic tool to achieve result. Due to community 
members’ unique demands and ideas, each situation requires its own individual solution and 
balance between various strategies. When looking for solutions to situations, CEWLA makes 
space for, and recognizes, the multiple discourses embedded in people’s lives. Religion is one 
of these many discourses at play, which CEWLA interacts with throughout their multiple 
activities. The religious knowledge among CEWLA members derives from a systematic 
engagement with religious authorities and is debated among various religious representatives. 
CEWLA’s use of religion is rather an indicator of the entangled relationship between a 
religious and secular dimension in Egyptian society, in particular within women’s rights 
work. 
Although CEWLA’s mission is heavily invested in the formal legal system of the state, 
the ways in which the organization chooses to interact with the grass roots are to large extent 
located within the informal sector and the informal law system. Feminist legal theorists, 
reaching from a liberal standpoint to the more postmodern notion of legal discourse, discuss 
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law as something that happens to individuals, and something that is created and controlled by 
a state (Tucker 2008). These western centered ideas of law as a relationship between the 
individual and the state is also the core element of many the human rights conventions. This 
relationship is also one of the demerits of human rights discourse (Kennedy 2002). 
Anthropological ethnographies interested in law have disclosed a more complex relationship 
than western-centered theories about law as something taking effect between the litigant and 
the state alone. In large parts of the world, often in countries with a colonial past or the 
absence of a functioning state, more than one normative order of law is applied (Tucker 
2008). Informal law is referred to as “a situation in which two or more legal systems coexist 
in the same social field,” where a legal system is defined as the system of courts and judges 
supported by the state as well as non-legal forms of normative ordering  (Merry 1988: 870). 
Nehada Shehada (2005) shows in her ethnography of court cases in Gaza City how law 
operates within a myriad of norms. Law is something that negotiates the interest of the 
litigant, in this case the woman. However, law also negotiates the maintenance of social 
norms and harmony in the society, which include the woman’s family and the society as a 
whole. Shehada’s fieldwork reveals that a large quantity of pluralism takes effect when 
judges, litigants, and kin meet in court to find solution to various disputes. Occasionally, 
following the initiative of the judge, cases are even processed outside of formal court and 
handled within the traditions of customary law. Shehada explains a case in which the judge 
initially knew that the female plaintiff did not have a chance to win the case over her deceased 
husband’s brother in the formal court. Therefore, the judge gathered the litigants for a couple 
of weeks of informal reconciliation. This indicates an informal system in place that is 
juxtaposed to the normative legal order, a system that is conditioned by traditional and 
customary orders.  
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In Egypt, such legal pluralism that involves informal avenues of conflict resolution can 
be theorized using the concept familial ethos. Singerman (2007) argues that, in order to 
capture all sites of politics and the changing modalities of power in Egypt, the informal sector 
of the familial ethos must be included in any analysis of civil society. Singeman further 
explains that the familial ethos is the legitimating discourse of political and economical 
dimensions that are not licensed, regulated, and numerated by the state. However, the familial 
ethos is extensively involved in almost all realms of political, economical, social, and moral 
life. It is described as an environment promoting solidarity, order, and reciprocity, and that 
supports a channel of arbitration, conflict resolution, economic assistance, and cooperation. 
This environment is made and remade every day. However, Egyptian historical legacy of 
intentional political exclusion by the state has large effect on this informal realm. 
Consequently, the familial ethos is not in any way isolated from the state (Singerman 2007). 
This political exclusion benefits some of its citizens and harms others, but importantly, greatly 
impacts the informal sectors. The state neglects large segments of the population in Egypt 
well functioning infrastructure and health service. Additionally, there are deficits in security 
are extensive, such as the lack of police or fire stations. While CEWLA, to large extent, 
interacts with the formal sector and the formal legislation in trying to reform them, when 
operating with the grassroots, they pursue many of their activities through the informal sector 
of the familial ethos. 
One of CEWLA’s many projects is to solve familial disputes outside of formal courts. A 
strategy CEWLA itself has chosen in lieu of the state-regulated system. The organization also 
educates local mediators about the principles of international human rights. These local 
mediators negotiate disputes that, even without CEWLA’s interaction, already are taking 
place outside of the state apparatus. Gawaahar, from the advocacy program, believes the 
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education of local mediators is a significant feature of CEWLA’s activity. Since Egypt is a 
legal society that has signed human rights conventions, it is the organization’s responsibility 
as an actor of civil society to assure that these conventions count for all segments of the 
population. CEWLA is consequently part of, and influences, the informal political networks 
that men and women create within the familial ethos.  
Both in family disputes and through the education of mediators, CEWLA embeds 
values of human rights within these informal sectors and networks. Additionally, the 
organization has to navigate among the various discursive spaces that construct the 
communities. In the next section, I reflect over some of these discourses. This will be done in 
relation to how CEWLA has managed to reframe some discourses and further been able to 
challenge the social imagination of the private-public demarcation.  
Embodied Discourses of Gendered Self  
During my interviews at CEWLA, I became aware of the fact that, in order to pursue their 
objectives, CEWLA’s staff makes use of prevailing discursive structures. This has resulted, to 
some extent, in transformation of the way certain discourses embody society and people’s 
daily choices and actions. One strong discourse is that of religion and its impact on family 
decision. Another important theme that emerges for CEWLA is the imagination of what 
concerns belong to the private and public realms. The private-public dichotomy becomes 
particularly clear when the interviewees spoke about the ways in which the organization, 
since the beginning, has tried to bring family matters into public debates.  
After a few years of work and increased legitimacy within the community, CEWLA 
started to tackle more “taboo” topics that were once silenced in Egyptian public discourse. 
Many of these topics are related to gender, marital life, and domestic violence. The center had 
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by now started social research projects and expanded their work to governorates outside of 
Greater Cairo, which deepened its knowledge about different communities in the country. 
Based on this new information and familiarities with women and men’s problems and 
positions, the NGO had managed to create spaces in which women, and sometimes men, felt 
comfortable to approach the organization and inquire about various problems in their families 
or communities. CEWLA picked up on the matters that were continuously presented to them, 
and with these personal narratives as references, they developed new programs, including 
focus on gender-based violence.  
In our interview, Sherif told me that CEWLA was extensively attacked by the society 
for bringing sensitive issues into public debates. For instance, al-Azhar accused them of 
spreading immorality within the community based on delusive facts. CEWLA insists that the 
topics, such as sexual violence and early marriage, are not immoral, but actual reality for 
people. These topics must be openly debated as matters of public concern. Several members 
of CEWLA explained that much of their work circles around convincing members of the 
government, religious institutions, and ordinary people in society that certain problems exist 
and are widely spread. In order to broaden public discourse, CEWLA publishes reports and 
statistics to demonstrate what Egypt’s reality looks like. To strengthen these arguments, 
CEWLA further points to individual cases. Incest was one such topic that required extensive 
work in order to be publicly recognized. Initially the topic was totally denied by government 
officials with the argument that such things did not exist in Egypt. However, CEWLA 
managed to convince government representatives that the organization was aware of several 
instances. They eventually met a promising response from officials, who agree to take action 
against the addressed issues. In this case, bringing issues that had been produced as private 
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into Egyptian public discourse, helped trigger both a public reaction and potentially legal 
prosecution.  
Feminists of various orientations have provided an intensive critique of the construction 
of the demarcation of private and public spheres, and have revealed how this division has 
impacted women’s lives and possibilities. Many feminists draw on, while also extensively 
critiquing, the work on Habermas (1989) and his theory of the bourgeois public sphere. 
According to Habermas, the public sphere developed as a site for rational discussion of public 
matters, resulting in public opinion about the “common good”. This public sphere functions as 
a link between the state and society, and holds the state accountable for its actions. However, 
feminists have stressed that the idea of woman as the natural child bearer, and therefore 
belonging to the private sphere of the family, resulted in a total exclusion of women from the 
public sphere (Grant 1991; Pateman 1989; Yuval Davis 1993). To be denied access to 
activities located in public is tantamount to being denied full citizenship (Turner 1990). 
Another problematic aspect with the private and public dichotomy was the question of the 
appropriate scope of publicity in relation to the private, determining which concerns should be 
counted as public and which as private (Fraser 1990). As women did not have equal access to 
this realm as much as their male fellow citizens, women were not participating in the decision 
making about where the demarcation should be drawn. Consequently, “matters” that affect 
many women’s lives were not recognized as common concerns. Although these theories are 
Euro-American centered, feminist activities in other parts of the world are also located within 
similar struggles to first, claim a voice in public debates and second, to argue that the family 
realm is something to be regarded as a public concern. As Seyla Benhabib states:  
All struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what 
had previously been considered private, non-public, and non-political issues as 
matters of public concern, as issues of justice, as sites of power (1992: 84). 
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Extensive contestations and debates in which women forcefully try to reveal systematic 
features of male dominance have, to some extent, resulted in the recognition of domestic 
violence as a public concern (Fraser 1991). To bring private matters into the public has been a 
main endeavor for many women’s NGOs, including CEWLA. Sherif explained that the issues 
they started to address were very much attached to the private sphere, and were considered to 
appropriately be solved without the broader community’s awareness. When the organization 
started to work with these kinds of problem, they entered a sensitive space. However, 
CEWLA members argue that the center gained more trust among community members. 
According to Sherif and other members, instead of CEWLA bringing up topics, women, and 
even a few men, began to approach the organization with their narratives. Sensitive issues, 
such as tribal marriages carried out against the spouse’s will, absence of documents proving 
children’s fathers, and sexual violence within families were exposed and eventually debated 
publicly. What interested me when listening to these narratives were partly what discursive 
subject positions are constructed from the social imagination that perceives these topics as 
private concerns. Furthermore, the stories drew my attention to how CEWLA became an actor 
in creating a shift in prevailing subject positions by creating space to act out previously 
“private” matters in the “public” domain.  
CEWLA’s interest in sensitive topics that include violence against women follows the 
international concern for gender-based violence in the Middle East and beyond. It lies outside 
the scope of this thesis to further explore this particular aspect of CEWLA’s work. 
Nevertheless, I believe more attention is required regarding how gender-based violence in the 
region is typically discussed and investigated. Most academic literature concerned with 
women, gender, and sexuality in the Middle East and South Asia has been highly problematic. 
It is often distilled to signify an issue of honor, which is perhaps the most problematic term in 
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feminist literature and women’s rights projects in a transnational world7. Honor has become 
the describing term for a particular cultural and ethnic behavior, which manifests itself as 
men’s control over moving bodies, public spaces, female sexuality, and social behavior. 
Honor is further a dominant term to use when discussing gendered based violence, such as so 
called “honor crime” especially in the Middle East and South Asia. Instead of problematizing 
social, political, and economical reasons and incentives why gender-based violence occurs, or 
discussing various incentives, it is described as a result of an honor culture. The use of the 
category overlooks all other reasons why violence against women exists. In a report defined 
as “a comparative situation analysis of honor violence, early marriages and sexual abuse in 
Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Yemen”, compiled by the Swedish Save 
the Children in 20078, the word honor occurs 404 times. “Honor crime” is defined in one 
sentence as “issues related to sexual morality and general behavior” (2007; 4). Throughout the 
document, “honor culture” is explained as the reason to why young girls are exposed to 
violence in their families. In the recommendation part of the report the authors conclude that 
in combating gender based sexual violence, four methods should be implemented: advocacy 
and awareness raising, research and analysis, direct support, knowledge dissemination and 
capacity building. It strikes me that these methods are recommended to the contexts of 
Yemen, the poorest country in the Middle East, which lacks substantial infrastructure and 
education. The recommendations are further pointed to countries that have been exposed to 
                                                 
7
 See Lila Abu-Lughod (2010) and her delightful analysis of the powers that produce and maintain the 
category of “honor crime”. Also see Shalhoub-Kevorikan (2010) for alternative ways to approach issues of 
gender and violence.  
8
 The research was an initiative by the Swedish Save the Children’s regional representatives and lead by 
Dr. Pernilla Ouis and co-ordinated by Tove Myhrdal from Malmö University, Sweden. The research team was 
further in contact with organizations and universities in Jerusaelm, Beirut, and Sanaa and the introduction 
chapter to each country is written by a local academic, or activist.  
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war and atrocity for decades. Yet, the recommendations do not even mention social and 
political justice, or call for an end of illegal occupation and atrocity of Palestinian territories 
and populace. Instead, the violence these girls are suffering from is solely discussed as a result 
of something that the report cannot even define and theorize—honor. It is not surprising then, 
that the report overlooks the political, social, and economical context of these countries and 
the possible liaison to gender-based violence. The (mis)use of the concept of honor as a 
cultural behavior is not just stigmatizing an act, but also entire cultures and ethnic 
communities, countries and, regions. Consequently, this precludes a comprehensive picture of 
the complex reasons why such acts are performed, or an exploration of the real incentives to 
violence against women. The result is obvious: ineffective, misdirected, and futile 
recommendations to how to work preventative and effective in order to battle domestic 
violence.  
Nevertheless, the ways in which honor has been conceptualized as a cultural behavior 
and used in the sense described above is widely questioned (Abu-Lughod 1985, 2010; Baxter 
2007; Joseph 1993). Baxter (2007) distances herself from the simplistic perception of honor, 
which resonates with me in relation to the narratives at CEWLA. For her, honor is a “wide-
ranging, dynamic, multi-stranded ideology about ‘right-living’” that is primarily about 
relationship among various selves, bolstered by notions of selfhood and subjectivity (Baxter 
2007; 238). To return to CEWLA’s experience with topics that are considered private 
concerns, Sherif told me that this is something set up and maintained by the male members in 
the community. Wesham further explained that matters concerning female sexuality are tied 
to male responsibility within the family. An understanding of honor as not just as a specific 
cultural complex, but as a web of “selves and permeability of its boundaries of one’s self, 
one’s feelings of esteem or lack thereof, one’s sense of legitimacy and ‘rightness’ [that] are 
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dependent on the actions of other” allows us to capture men’s actions as performances that 
invoke assumptions of their gendered selves (Baxter 2007; 744).  
From a poststructuralist approach, the self can be understood as the composite of 
multiple subjectivities that are brought about within myriads of discourses and discursive 
practice. The particular context in which CEWLA operates consists of multiple and 
fragmented gendered discourses, some more dominant than others. Since one actively takes 
up and is shaped by discourse, individuals are both socialized by- and agents within/against 
these discourses (Davies and Banks 1992). One individual is hence not the same as one 
subject position since persons constitute their sense of self through several, often 
contradictory, subject positions (Moore 2007). In relation to gender, the self is embedded in 
the many gendered discourses that shape the subject positions among individuals. This 
includes discourses of private versus public, masculinity, femininity, sexuality, and family 
relations. Sherif and Wesham’s description of male family members’ various responsibilities 
over the family and towards the public is a male subject position as the guardian of female 
family members’ sexuality. Within this framework, male family members do not only guard 
female sexuality, but also resolve matters related to this in private, confined to the realm of 
the family.  
However, women are also creating their gendered self through these discourses, which 
all are at play when women approach CEWLA with sensitive topics. The post-structural 
approach can facilitate understanding women’s actions. The process of feminists’ struggle to 
destabilize what issues were confined to the private sphere, such as female sexuality, became 
a question of legal institution and law. Feminist legal theorists have debated which kind of 
law construction has the best potential to challenge gender inequalities, and how law in itself 
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is constructing its own subjects, affecting the consciousness of self. When a matter, such as 
violence in intimate relations, falls under juridical power the state has the responsibility to 
protect individuals from violence from their closest relatives. In a juridical process, this 
becomes a transformation of the relationship between the individual and the family, kin, and 
community. Additionally, this process creates a new relationship with the legal system and the 
state.  
Sally Merry (2006) uses the poststructuralist framework of self to understand the ways 
in which battered women experience law. By engaging with law the woman takes on a new 
subject position, defined in the discourse and social practice of law, and hence enacts another 
self. Depending on the particular gendered discourses that surround the woman, her 
experiences of the new subject position vary. Merry further explains that the new subject 
position within the law, which has resulted in pressing charges against her partner, might feel 
alienating. Consequently, the woman may returns back to the subject position less challenging 
to her partner and maybe her kin. This can explain how battered women, after an initial 
contact with the police, the state, and legal institution discards this contact and “return home”. 
At times, this procedure is repeated several times. Merry (2006) argues that it is of critical 
significance how women, who turn to social services and legal officials, are supported by the 
legal system for their decisions to remain in the subject position of the legal subject.  
Following this argument, we may be able to capture what happens when women turn to 
CEWLA with sensitive narratives. The performance of approaching an organization, talking 
to a complete stranger about something that is understood from within another subject 
position as private, and to perhaps even present oneself as a victim is to take on another 
subject position. This subject position is not necessarily that of a legal subject shaped by 
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social practice of law as in Merry’s example, even though a contact with CEWLA eventually 
can result in such subject position. Instead, it is a subject position that is shaped by discourses 
of autonomy and choice, which create space for reasonable behavior. The various gendered 
discursive practices at play are creating the conditional potentials for women to shift subject 
positions in this sense. However, CEWLA’s presence, the organization’s established trust 
within the community, and the members’ ability to appear cognizant are significant factors for 
many women’s decisions to bring private matters to a level beyond the family. Accordingly, 
CEWLA has been a catalyst for changing the ways in which private matters are dealt. This is 
in line with the feminist struggle of making the personal political. 
Wesham reveals that CEWLA does not only create spaces for women to take on new 
subject positions, but also men. Within three months, six fathers from the neighborhood in 
which CEWLA is located approached the center for guidance in a private family concern. The 
fathers had in one way or another become aware that their daughters had had involuntary 
intercourse with their male cousins. The fathers had approached CEWLA and asked for 
advice. Their concern was how their daughters would be able to marry in the future, given 
that she had had a pre-marital sexual relation. Members at CEWLA are completely aware of 
the importance of protecting a young woman’s reputation within the community, and 
therefore suggested that the fathers sign a marriage contract between the cousins. This 
contract could later be used as proof that the girl had had legitimate intercourse earlier in life. 
To put charges on the cousin and expose the situation to the whole community was not seen 
as a viable option. Neither would this alternative have improved the chances for the girl to 
marry in the future. Wesham, who works as acounselor for women, girls, families, and men, 
told me that this alternative is the most shielding towards the young girl. After the girl is 
married to her cousin, CEWLA follows up on her and provides counseling and therapy so that 
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she can work through her experience together with professionals, and hopefully continue with 
her life sound and well. I asked what would happen if the young girl refused to marry. 
Wesham explained that the marriage contract could be signed and then they would divorce the 
couple straight after. The contract could then be used in the future as a proof. She told me that 
in three out of the six cases, the couples were still married and that CEWLA had continuous 
contact with the girls.  
 This strategy does not challenge the profound structure of the society and expected 
gendered positions. However, CEWLA’s presence makes male members of the community 
enact rather radical shifting subject positions. As this narrative explains, these fathers enact 
multiple subject positions that constitute their internal sense as a father.  The sense of being a 
father is also part of their self as husband and male member of a family, a community, a work 
place, and so forth. These subject positions are shaped by myriads of gendered discourses in 
society, some more dominant than others (Moore 1994). Wesham told me that concerns 
related to sexuality within the family are normally taken care of by fathers. The concern over 
the daughter’s reputation, reveled in their contact with CEWLA, reflects a subject position as 
the care-taker for his daughter’s honor, which includes not exposing any instances vis-à-vis 
the daughter outside of the family. However, this subject position comes in conflict with the 
concern over the daughter’s chance to get married after he becomes aware of the situation 
with the male cousin. After all, his role as a father is also to equip his child for marriage and 
to create potentials for what he believes is a good future. Between these contradictory subject 
positions, the father turns to CEWLA for advice. This way of bringing an earlier private 
concern to the premises of CEWLA and discuss this beyond the family is to take on a new 
subject position. While the father is still enacting the position as protector of the daughter’s 
sexuality, he enacts a new subject position, which negotiates the private-public discourse. 
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Even Wesham was surprised that many fathers chose to seek help from the center. She 
believes the fathers come to them because of the gained trust within the community. She takes 
it as an indicator that people feel convinced that CEWLA can assist and help them in difficult 
situations. This is, according to Wesham, what makes their activities significant. 
My choice to utilize the poststructuralist framework regarding these narratives is to 
capture the more complex processes of gendered selves that can be traced to issues of gender 
and sexuality, as well as gender and violence in the Egypt. To move away from a paralyzed 
sojourn at the cultural construction of honor will consequently avoid stigmatization of people 
and communities. It will further open up for analysis that reflect on the local, national, and 
international politics, and institutional and cultural dynamics, all essential to any analysis of 
women’s lives and gendered societies. 
As earlier discussed, another discourse that generates gendered positions in Egyptian 
society is the religious discourse. Besides countering the prevailing religious discourse at the 
state level, CEWLA also engages with this discourse embodied on the ground among 
community members. Noura explained that in general, people have many misinterpretations 
of religion. As a result, she feels these misconceptions must be challenged. She gave 
examples of when women claim that the angels will torture them throughout the night, if their 
husbands are unhappy with them as wives. Other examples include the notion that a wife must 
bow to her husband.  “Where do people get this from” she asked. For Noura, the way out of 
these misunderstandings are not to abandon religion. Instead she believes that CEWLA must 
try to provide people with the right knowledge. For this reason, members of CEWLA are 
focus on providing alternative and sound religious reasoning to contest incorrect religious 
assumptions and interpretations. All this information, she continues, must come from verified 
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information. CEWLA staff refers back to the Sunna and Hadith, they use information 
provided by the progressive people within al-Azhar, and try to highlight manipulated and 
wrong cited Hadith. Noura explains that there was a time after the prophet’s death, when 
many false Hadith were spread. It is significant to expose these false claims and correct them. 
She refers to some Hadith as examples, which seem to justify female genital cutting. 
However, as she puts it: “We know that in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim societies, this 
practice does not exist” (Interview with Noura, conducted February 2011).  
 Religion is also referenced by my interviewees when we discussed marriage, divorce, 
alimony, custody, and how to behave towards spouses and children. It is revealed that within 
these spaces of family life, religious discourse is significant for shaping gendered positions. 
This religious discourse is recognized by CEWLA as deeply embedded in the social 
imagination of the Egyptian society, which also becomes an axiomatic feature of the 
organization’s work. Al-Sharmani (2011) explored how CEWLA’s thoroughly deployment of 
religion results in a broader religious discourse Al-Sharmani met with women who, through 
the assistance from CEWLA and other women’s NGOs, were recently granted khul’. She 
explains how these women view khul’ as something granted to them by God. Al-Sharmani 
views this as a trickledown effect from the efforts of CEWLA to provide an understanding of 
Shari’a that is different from earlier interpretations of classical jurisprudence. This once again 
points to the organization’s use of religion as something else than a strategic tool. Instead of 
instrumentalizing religious discourse in order to gain support, CEWLA operates within the 
discourse of Shari’a and reframes the prevailing understandings.  
This reframing and broadening of discourses take place within the operational spaces of 
CEWLA’s various projects. These spaces are the last subject for discussion in this chapter, 
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expanding the discussion about how CEWLA utilizes the particular context of Egyptian 
informal realm.    
Operational and Social Spaces towards Generating Change 
The reframing of religious discourses are processes that take place within CEWLA’s 
formalized operational spaces. Many of the programs and projects at CEWLA are conceived 
through interaction with the community and individuals. During my interviews at CEWLA, I 
repeatedly asked where the idea of a particular program derived from, in order to excavate if 
there was an underlying ideological objective behind the initiative. However, in all interviews 
I consistently received narratives that linked project ideas to the experience of individuals or 
groups in the community. When the organization started to promote legal awareness, they 
consistently discovered new problems. Sherif compares it to a snowballing effect. CEWLA 
addressed one issue, which was preceded by another issue, which also was preceded by a 
different issue, and so forth. After several rounds, the center’s legal awareness project ended 
up in literacy training. Illiteracy was identified as the initial impediment for many people to 
enjoy their rights. 
In the previous section, CEWLA’s counseling projects were discussed as a space in 
which women and fathers shift subject positions and negotiate private public discourse. The 
counseling project also provides community members therapy and psychological support. 
These particular projects started after several women had approached the organization with 
their marital problems and asked for advice. The appeal for guidance and recommendations in 
complicated situations made CEWLA decide to formalize a section for such issues and 
established counseling, therapy, and also a hot-line. As described, these projects are now also 
approached by men and families in general, not only by women.  
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One of CEWLA’s many programs is developed in order to help women after divorce.  
The organization assists divorced women in their process of finding a job and to establish a 
secure financial situation. This reveals CEWLA’s deep understanding of the various forces 
conditioning women’s lives in Egypt. CEWLA recognizes that even though women have the 
legal right to divorce, this is not a guarantee that a woman can leave an unwanted marriage. 
The economical context of a woman’s life could be an impediment for her to continue a 
livelihood without the support of a husband. This project illustrates that CEWLA 
acknowledges women as more than solely legal subjects, but subjects to economical politics.  
A third activity that operates within the informal realm is the project of assisting 
families in various disputes. Within CEWLA’s advocacy program, the center tries to resolve 
family disputes outside of court. The idea of solving various kinds of family disputes outside 
of the formal legal system emerged during a project in which the organization assisted women 
during their divorce court trials. They realized that most of the cases took years and that the 
state legal system is disturbed by several factors. When CEWLA met a woman whose divorce 
case had extended for seven years, the center decided to do something about the situation. 
Several of my interviewees argued that the main problem with the law system is the fact that 
private matters, like divorce, alimony cases, and custody take several years to process in a 
court. CEWLA tries to circumnavigate this problem by resolving many of the disputes 
brought to them outside of the court. Wisham, who currently works with this processes, 
explained that in order to cause as little harm as possible to the woman, and in many cases 
even children, the most salient aspect is to complete mediations through a peaceful and calm 
procedure. A peaceful process will also have the best potential to make the outcome as 
positive as possible for all parts involved. Mediation service in familial disputes is also 
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implemented by the Egyptian state. However, when this activity operates within the state-
regulated institution, it looks rather different than when CEWLA provides it.   
Since 2000, a number of reforms in the Egyptian family law were passed, of which one 
is the previously discussed khul’. Another reform is the implementation of new family courts 
in 2004, and the obligation to file for mediation sessions between the spouses before one can 
file a court case. The motives for the new family courts are to retain the values of the family 
as sanctity, and to provide quick, effective, and just cases for the litigants (Al-Sharmani 
2008). The obligatory mediation sessions are carried out by three experts in psychology, law, 
and social work and may progress for at least a period of 15 days. Al-Sharmani (2008) and 
Sonnewald (2010) conducted fieldwork inside the family courts where mediation takes place, 
and they reveal how this seemingly positive procedure operates in reality. Al-Sharmani 
explains that, since it is only obligatory to file for mediation but not to attend the sessions, 
husbands are often absent, and sometimes even the wives. The mediation sessions are taking 
place in non-private spaces, which are inconvenient for a family dispute session. Al-Sharmani 
further argues that the sessions are ineffective in the procedural practice, and lacks 
knowledgeable and experienced mediation experts.  A remarkable character that both al-
Sharmani and Sonnewald capture is that the processes often have a gendered connotation. 
Their fieldworks reveal gendered views among judges and mediation experts on women in 
relation to gender roles, female sexuality, rationality, and negative views on women filing for 
khul’. Al-Sharmani claims that the new family court and the obligatory mediation have, in 
general, not improved the legal status for women or resulted in any other amendments during 
the legal process. She concludes that, since substantive laws, which are discriminatory against 
women, are still implemented, the fragmented strategy of reform adoption, and the remarkable 
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gendered connotation during legal processes, women still face unequal legal status compared 
to their husbands.  
The studies of al-Sharmani (2008) and Sonnewold (2010) reveal that regardless of law 
reforms in the Egyptian family legislation, there are continuing shortcomings. These 
shortcomings are also expressed during the interviews at CEWLA. It is clear that the CEWLA 
members do not harbor many positive views about the court procedure. The organization’s 
position towards the legal system is also expressed in CEWLA’s report regarding khul’. The 
report states that a law reform alone is not enough for giving women a just legal status and 
fair court trials.  
The mediation service that CEWLA offers is for many reasons different from the one 
implemented by the state. A significant aspect is that mediation sessions operate outside of the 
formal legislation and bureaucracy, hence CEWLA’s mediation is not obligatory in any sense. 
When a mediation session is scheduled, the involved parties have already voluntarily agreed 
to try solving their disputes with help from CEWLA.  Consequently, the parties have initially 
a more positive attitude to the strategy, which, in turn, gives larger potentials to an agreement. 
What might be even more significant is the fact that the mediation sessions carried out by 
members of CEWLA have minimal chances to proceed with a gendered connotation of the 
kind disclosed in the family courts. Members of CEWLA have been fighting for women’s 
rights to file for khul’ for decades, and do not possess any negative views towards women for 
using her legitimate right. Neither would they base a woman’s rights to divorce on reasons 
based on female sexuality, but on women’s individual right as equal before the law like their 
fellow male citizens. A gender neutral mediation process handles each case based on the 
perception that every individual is legitimated with rights and obligations in the particular 
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case instead of reinforcing gendered perspectives on women, men, and family roles similar to 
how it is done within the family courts.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed CEWLA’s organizational operation in the community. In many 
perspectives, these projects differ from how the center engages with the state and official 
representatives. I have focused on four main features of this work: the mechanisms of 
framing, the usage of Egypt’s informal legal sector, CEWLA’s negotiation with discursive 
spaces, and the organization’s operational realm of their various projects and programs. These 
are all interconnected and reciprocally determine CEWLA’s work with the grassroots.  
While CEWLA’s activity is conditioned by the discursive spaces in the community, the 
center negotiates these in order to reach certain objectives. Although CEWLA officially 
pursues the mission to move Egypt towards a legal system that complies with the international 
treaties and standards of human rights, the organization’s daily work necessitates 
maneuvering among various discursive, legal, and social levels. This negotiation sometimes 
requires staff to settle for more immediate goals. CEWLA navigates through the various 
frameworks of international human rights and religious discourse and finds ways in which 
each unique case can be fruitfully resolved. The ways in which CEWLA handles many social 
issues can, to some extent, results in changing the social imagination among people.  
This chapter reveals that CEWLA’s activists must be credited by their community in 
which they operate. Simultaneously, the organization must stand by the basic ideas of human 
rights, which many times conflict with prevailing norms, beliefs, and social practices. 
CEWLA’s efforts to produce counter discourses within the already established activity 
through negotiating, broadening, and reframing the prevailing discourses can again be 
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paralleled with Gramsci’s notion of counter hegemony. Sally Merry (2006b) refers to people 
within these professions, translators or intermediaries, as they translate the discourse and 
practice of international law into the specific situation of their community, region, or state. 
CEWLA translates the international human rights conventions through a careful examination 
of each case, and then approaches the situation the way the center believes will have the best 
result for the individuals involved. This chapter argues that CEWLA cannot single-handedly 
create radical changes in Egypt or within the community in which it operates. However, the 
organization’s way of translating international human rights into local justice through 
navigating and negotiating local discursive spaces, challenges the discourses at play. To some 
extent, this element of CEWLA’s work changes the social imagination of the private and 
public demarcation, and generates shifting gendered selves among community members.  
Finally, CEWLA’s engagement with religious discourse is not a cultural gesture. 
Instead, CEWLA recognizes the complex context of Egypt and the multiple discourses 
structuring people’s lives and on which the social imagination is based. The NGO operates in 
a community where the demarcation between the secular and religious dimensions is vague 
and this is framing the whole organizational work of CEWLA.  
An analysis of the reasons why CEWLA engages with religion, in particular Islam, is 
carried out in the following concluding chapter. I tie this discussion back to my research 
questions and the current debates regarding women’s NGOs’ employment of religion in 
women’s rights work. The conclusion reflects over further research and the significance of 
entering women’s rights work with a nuanced approach towards the demarcation of secular 
and religious based women’s activism.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Through this project, I have explored the ways in which a women’s NGO in Cairo deploys 
religion, and in particular Islam, to its work. The reason for selecting the Center for Egyptian 
Women’s Legal Assistance as my research base is due to the organization’s promotion of 
dialogue regarding religion and gender politics, and its engagement with the institution of al-
Azhar and religious authorities. It is a site in which secular-religious dichotomies are 
challenged. Through analyzing CEWLA’s work, I have highlighted how women’s activism 
can be performed across frameworks and ideologies. 
This thesis draws on narratives on several CEWLA members who work within the 
center’s different programs. These members utilize various methods, and position themselves 
in distinctive ways towards Islamic discourse within women’s activism and gender politics. 
Interviews with these members have enabled the thesis to: 1) Map and analyze the 
organization’s deployment of religious discourses and knowledge 2) trace their origins and 3) 
explore the reasons why this religious deployment is at play in the first place. Further, by 
situating CEWLA within transnational feminism, Egyptian NGO work, and women’s rights 
discourse, this thesis elucidates the complex and multilayered ways in which CEWLA 
deploys religion. Islamic discourse is referred and utilized when CEWLA is countering 
religious discourse produced by the state and when developing proposals for legal reforms. 
Additionally, religion is deployed when the organization engages with the discursive spaces 
of local communities and the grassroots.  
My interviews at CEWLA reveal that the engagement of religion is profoundly 
conditioned by Egypt’s particular social, economical, and political context. It is further linked 
to the transnational discourse on women’s rights. CEWLA members are the intermediaries 
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between the local and global spaces of women’s rights and gender justice. Within these 
spaces, Islamic discourses have become a significant element because of the growing 
international appeal for Islamic politics and the consensus that Islam and women’s rights must 
reconcile. CEWLA is one of many actors that try to broaden the prevailing religious discourse 
within these spaces by encouraging and promoting open debates between actors of civil 
society, the state, and religious institutions.  
By tracing the extensive deployment of religion at CEWLA, this project confronts 
scholarship that categorizes women’s activism into either religious or secular based projects. 
Such categorization is often based upon the various frameworks that organizations and 
movements espouse. I argue that the Egyptian society, in relation to gender politics and 
women’s activism, is too complex for this approach. This categorization of women’s activism 
overlooks the vague division of the secular and religious dimensions in Egypt. In turn, this 
precludes a comprehensive understanding of women’s activism and the prospects for gender 
justice in Muslim societies. CEWLA explicates the necessity of navigating among various 
frameworks rather than espousing one framework alone.  
A nuanced understanding of the concepts of religion versus secular is required, in order 
to capture how these concepts manifest in the Egyptian society. Therefore, this thesis explores 
the historic trajectories of the ways in which these concepts have been conceptualized in 
western academic tradition. Further, this nuanced approach is applied to my process of 
analyzing how women’s activism in general and CEWLA in particular operates within Egypt. 
This thesis argues that, although CEWLA is guided by international human rights framework, 
the knowledge, sensibilities, and ethics at CEWLA cannot be traced back to this framework 
alone.  
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Furthermore, a nuanced conceptualization of the secular and the religious is used when I 
discuss contemporary scholarly debates regarding the employment of religious discourse in 
women’s rights work. I argue that CEWLA’s activities add significant perspectives to these 
debates. Critical voices regarding the activity to use religious knowledge as a route to social 
change is that it is packaging religion into a static entity (recall my critique of Sholkamy, 
2011). CEWLA thoroughly deploys religious knowledge, especially when developing 
proposals legal reform. In this process, CEWLA encourages dialogue and debate among 
various actors regarding women’s rights, the Egyptian family legislation, and Shari’a. This 
creates a space where human interpretation of Shari’a in relation to gender politics is openly 
discussed, which has revealed how classical interpretations of Shari’a are widely questioned 
among contemporary Islamic scholars. These new interpretations of women’s rights within 
Shari’a have been used as a theological base in CEWLA’s proposals for legal amendments. 
CEWLA’s approach is hence far from perceiving or promoting religion as a static entity, 
rather as a discourse open for contestation.  
There is also discussion of an ongoing islamization of human rights discourse (Mustafa 
2011). I am arguing that CEWLA’s work points towards another direction. The organization 
utilizes international human rights conventions as clear guiding principles. However, CEWLA 
members believe that a reinterpreted Shari’a is not an impediment for a family law that 
simultaneously recognizes the human rights principles and agrees with Shari’a. Consequently, 
Islamic discourse is not the norm to which the human rights principles must correspond. 
Instead, the international human rights conventions are the guiding tool in the route towards 
proposed amendments in the family legislation.  
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To perceive women as legal subjects troubles Abu-Lughod (2009). She addresses 
projects for improving women’s rights through Islamic knowledge by asking how 
reconciliation between Islamic discourse and women’s rights will bring justice to women 
whose lives are subjected to more than right deficits. This is an important reflection, 
especially since most of Egyptian women’s NGOs operate from a rights based framework. 
This thesis subscribes to the fact that legal reforms are not a guarantee that women’s lives and 
possibilities are improved. Although CEWLA is well integrated in the framework of legal 
rights, the organization performs many interesting projects beyond law. For instance, 
CEWLA runs projects, which assist divorced women by providing them help towards a 
secured economic livelihood. CEWLA also offers divorced women group sessions with 
women in similar situations in order to open up dialogue about women’s various experiences. 
CEWLA’s work corresponds to Abu-Lughod’s argument that women are more than legal 
subject since economic and social politics also affect their lives. CEWLA shows how 
religious knowledge can be utilized in projects that simultaneously approach various 
dimensions of women’s lives, legal as well as economical.  
This project employs a critical stance towards civil society by questioning civil society 
and NGO work as a route to social change. However, CEWLA’s work with the grassroots 
shows that the organization actually is in a position to challenge discourses embedded in the 
local communities. CEWLA members negotiate these multiple discursive spaces and makes 
use of them to pursue their objectives. Although the organization’s strategy does not result in 
any profound structural changes, to some extent, it transforms the way certain popular 
sensibilities embody society and people’s daily choices and actions. By adopting post-
structural theory of self, I have explored the processes of shifting subject positions taken place 
when women and men approach CEWLA with personal issues. Within this process, the 
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discursive demarcation of the public private realm is radically challenged among community 
members. CEWLA members view this as an indicator that the center has earned trust within 
the community.  
The ways in which CEWLA members navigate among the myriad of discourses and 
structures of Egyptian society has troubled my own position towards NGO work and my 
expressed critique. My interviewees are, as much as interlocutors of the processes I critique, 
the agents structuring activities in the midst of these power relations. Thus, the critique 
towards NGO work is not to devaluate the work that NGO participants perform on a daily 
basis in their respective communities. Rather it is to point to the forces that determine the 
structural conditions under which they are operating.  
Without suggesting that this project in any sense can represent women’s activism within 
the vibrant civil society in Egypt, I have pointed to the significance of continuous debate 
regarding religious discourse, women’s rights work, and gender justice. Through this case 
study, I have explored the problems of a strictly marked demarcation between secular and 
religious based women’s activism. I argue that it provides a misleading picture of the complex 
and multifaceted work that is performed. I suggest that further research regarding women’s 
rights work and women’s activism within Muslim societies move away from entering projects 
by determining whether or not a particular civic work is religious-based or not. To look at 
several organizations, in the same vein as this project, would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of women’s activism and the myriad of strategies and frameworks employed to 
reach objectives and goals. Especially, since Egypt is going through a historical phase of 
transition to democracy. 
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In the beginning, I argued for the importance of a knowledge production that contest 
that Muslim women is a homogenous group with life conditions linked to religion and culture. 
These prejudices and stereotypes are widely spread across the globe. Together with a 
manipulation of feminist language of equality and liberation, these forces cause Muslim 
women extensive harm through discrimination, atrocity, war, and islamophobia. I believe that 
one of feminism’s most vital contemporary missions is to, with all means, contest these forces 
theoretically, practically, and with extensive research. Feminists should never agree to have 
their ideals used for justification to war, undemocratic policies, discriminatory laws, or 
mobilizing any “civilizing mission”. Through showing the complex character of women’s 
rights work in Egypt, and the fluid relationship between religious and secular elements in the 
Egyptian society, I hope to have added a voice to the body of work that opposes such 
oppressive forces.  
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VIII.  ACRONYMS 
 
ADEW—Association for the Development and Enhancement of Women 
CEDAW—Conventions on Elimination of all forms of Discriminations against Women 
CEWLA—Center for Egyptian Women Legal Assistance 
ECWR—Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights 
GTZ—German Technical Center 
INGO—International Non Governmental Organization 
MOSA—Ministry of Social Affairs 
MWO—Muslim World Outreach 
NCW—National Council for Women 
NGO—Non Governmental Organization 
NWF—New Woman Foundation 
NWRO—Network of Women’s Rights Organizations 
PSL—Personal Status Law 
SAP—Structural Adjustment Program 
UN—United Nation 
UNICEF—United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund  
WMF—Women and Memory Forum 
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